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Apology, Forgiveness, Reconciliation 
& Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Susan Daicoff* 
“It’s a sad, sad situation and it’s getting more and more absurd. 
Why can’t we talk it over . . . . Sorry seems to be the hardest word . . .” 
—Elton John1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, public apologies underscored the power of contrition.  Profes-
sional golfer Tiger Woods apologized for his marital unfaithfulness by say-
ing, “I want to say to each one of you simply and directly I am deeply sorry 
for my irresponsible and selfish behavior I engaged in.”2  The chairman of 
BP Oil Company apologized for referring to local individuals and businesses 
as “small people” and said, “I spoke clumsily this afternoon, and for that, I 
am very sorry.”3  Toyota Motor Corporation’s president apologized for the 
braking defects in the company’s cars by saying, “First, I want to sincerely 
apologize to Toyota owners.  I know that our recalls have caused many of 
you concern and for that I am truly sorry.”4  One reporter in 2004 asserted 
 
* Susan Daicoff, J.D., M.S., LL.M., Professor of Law, Arizona Summit Law School.  This article is 
based on a speech by the author entitled Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Adversarialism to Mutu-
ality in the Practice of Law.  Susan Daicoff, Speech at the Interdisciplinary Study of Conflict and 
Dispute Resolution Symposium: Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Adversarialism to Mutuality in 
the Practice of Law (Apr. 10, 2009). 
 1. ELTON JOHN, Sorry Seems to be The Hardest Word, in BLUE MOVES (MCA Records 
1976).  See Ed Hogan, Sorry Seems to Be the Hardest Word, ALLMUSIC, 
http://www.allmusic.com/song/sorry-seems-to-be-the-hardest-word-mt0015784503.  Written by El-
ton John and his long-term collaborator, Bernie Taupin, the song was a hit in 1976.  Id. 
 2. Tiger Woods, Tiger Wood’s apology: full transcript, CNN (Feb. 19, 2010, 12:20 PM) 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/02/19/tiger.woods.transcript/index.html. 
 3. BP Boss Sorry About His ‘Small People’ Remark, MSN (June 16, 2010, 8:55 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37739658/ns/disaster_in_the_gulf/t/bp-boss-sorry-about-small-
people-remark/. 
 4. Ishita Sood, Toyota Issues Public Apology; to Restart Production of 8 Models, THE 
MONEY TIMES (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.themoneytimes.com/featured/20100202/toyota-issues-
public-apology-restart-production-8-models-id-1099124.html. 
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that “[t]he power of the words, ‘I’m sorry’—too little heard in daily life and 
all but forgotten in modern politics—may be stronger than we know.”5 
Apologies are not only becoming more common; they are good business 
practice.6  Author Martin Lasden reports that, in 1987, after the Veteran Af-
fairs hospital in Lexington, Kentucky adopted an apology policy, its mal-
practice claims fell below that of other veterans’ hospitals.7  He claims that, 
in 2001, Johns Hopkins Hospital adopted a policy strongly encouraging its 
doctors to admit errors and apologize, even if it caused a risk of legal expo-
sure.8  In 2003, its expense payments related to legal claims dropped by thir-
ty percent.9  Finally, Lasden reports that, in 2002, when the University of 
Michigan Health System adopted an apology policy, its malpractice lawsuits 
dropped by half.10  Colorado surgeon Dr. Michael Woods has been credited 
with the idea that “a doctor’s attitude is often more of a trigger for litigation 
than the actual instance of malpractice.”11  One writer concluded, “There is 
growing conviction in medical circles that the malpractice issue can be as-
suaged by two simple words, ‘I’m sorry.’”12 
Further, the law is developing to encourage apology.  The website of the 
Sorry Works! Coalition reports that thirty-six states have statutes preventing 
expressions of sympathy from being introduced as evidence in court, includ-
ing California, Florida, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.13  
 
 5. The Hardest Word, FOLIO WKLY., Nov. 16, 2004 [hereinafter The Hardest Word]. 
 6. Michael B. Runnels, Dispute Resolution & New Governance: Role of the Corporate Apol-
ogy, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 481, 484 (2011) (“the use of corporate apologies is both good business 
and good ethics”).  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial, in THE AFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 295–96 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007) [hereinafter SILVER] (reporting the 
experience of the Toro Corporation in handling lawsuits against it: “By 1999, Toro had saved over 
$75 million by switching from a combative to a conciliatory approach”). 
 7. Martin Lasden, Saying You’re Sorry, CALIFORNIA LAWYER MAG. (June 2005), available 
at http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=718449&evid=1. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. The Hardest Word, supra note 6.  See also Douglas Wojcieszak, Sorry Works!: The Dis-
closure and Apology Movement (unpublished essay). 
 11. The Hardest Word, supra note 6 (citing MICHAEL S. WOODS, M.D. & JASON ISAAC STAR, 
HEALING WORDS: THE POWER OF APOLOGY IN MEDICINE (2007)). 
 12. The Hardest Word, supra note 6. 
 13. See Runnels, supra note 7, at 499 (citing States with Apology Laws, SORRY WORKS!, 
http://sorryworkssite.bondwaresite.com/apology-laws-cms-143).  See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12-2605 (2005); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160 (West 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2003); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-184d (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318 (2006); FLA. 
STAT. § 90.4026 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 626-1, Rule 409.5 
(2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207 (2006); Ill. Pub. Act 094-0677 Sec. 8-1901, 735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/8-1901 (2005); IND. CODE ANN. 34-43.5-1-1 to 34-43.5-1-5 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 622.31 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.5 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. § 2907 (2005); MD. 
CODE. ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC.§ 10-920 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233 § 23D (1986); MO. 
2
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In federal cases, Federal Rule of Evidence 408 makes apologies made in the 
course of settlement negotiations generally inadmissible to prove liability.14 
The more frequent use of apologies reflects an ongoing change in to-
day’s legal profession from adversarialism to collaboration,15 from individu-
alism to collectivity, interdependence, and interrelationships,16 from a focus 
on rights to an inclusion of needs,17 and from fault finding and assignations 
of blame to healing and reconciliation.18  Since at least 1990, a number of 
emerging developments have embodied these shifts, in many substantive ar-
 
ANN. STAT. § 538.229 (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-814 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-
1201 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:4 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 413 (2004); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-12 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190 (2006); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-12-14 (2005); TENN. CODE. ANN §.409.1 (West 2003); TEX. CIV. PRAC. 
& REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-18 (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12, § 1912 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52.1 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.66.010 (2002); 63 
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-11a (2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130 (2004). 
 14. FED. R. EVID. 408 (statements or conduct made in compromise negotiations not admissible 
to prove liability or to impeach through a prior inconsistent statement).  The full rule states: “(a) 
Prohibited uses.  Evidence of the following is not admissible—on behalf of any party—either to 
prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent 
statement or a contradiction: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering—or accepting, promising to ac-
cept, or offering to accept—a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise 
the claim; and (2) conduct or statements made during compromise negotiations about the claim—
except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public of-
fice in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.  (b) Exceptions.  The 
court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, 
negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or 
prosecution.”  Id. 
 15. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. KING, NONADVERSARIAL JUSTICE (2009) (documenting the rise of 
nonadversarial law); J. KIM WRIGHT, LAWYERS AS PEACEMAKERS (2010) (overviewing the entire 
comprehensive law movement in the United States, with special emphasis on practicing lawyers’ 
perspectives). 
 16. See, e.g., Thomas D. Barton, Troublesome Connections: The Law and Post-Enlightenment 
Culture, 47 EMORY L.J. 163 (1998) (arguing that a sea change has occurred in society’s philoso-
phies). 
 17. See, e.g., PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW (2001) (indicating the importance of 
focusing on needs as well as legal rights in resolving family law disputes “collaboratively” rather 
than adversarially). 
 18. See, e.g., SILVER, supra note 7 (collecting writings on how to practice law as a healing 
profession) and DENNIS P. STOLLE, DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, EDS., PRACTICING 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (2000) (an earlier work collecting writings on how to practice law as 
a healing profession in various contexts, such as litigation, criminal law, family law, etc.) [hereinaf-
ter PTJ] (both works document the rise of a healing, peacemaking approach to practicing and adjudi-
cating law). 
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eas of the law.19  I have argued that these are evidence of a greater, overall 
movement towards a more humanistic form of practicing, adjudicating, and 
making law: the “comprehensive law movement.”20  One of the most influ-
ential of these developments is “therapeutic jurisprudence,” which seeks to 
make law a healing profession by exploring its potential to heal individuals, 
relationships, and society.21 
I have been researching these developments, or “vectors,” for just over a 
decade, asserting that together they form a single, comprehensive law 
movement.22  Its guiding principles ask: (1) how can law be a positive force 
in individuals’ lives and in society; (2) how can law be practiced, adjudicat-
ed, and enforced in a way that promotes human wellbeing; (3) when should 
law focus on more than simple legal rights (for example, how can it take into 
account the psychological or relational needs of the parties involved as 
well); and (4) when should legal matters be resolved by collaboration, dia-
logue, interaction on an equal playing field, mutual understanding, and em-
pathy, rather than by traditional adversarial trials, fact finding, and judicial 
decision making?23 
Apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation are relevant to many of the in-
dividual vectors, or disciplines, making up the comprehensive law move-
ment.  As a result, these vectors may benefit from placing a more explicit 
focus on apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation.  Practitioners and teachers 
of these disciplines can benefit from learning more about how to make them 
most effective and how to foster and facilitate their occurrence. 
This article will briefly define the apology, forgiveness, and reconcilia-
tion processes and their benefits.  It will then examine the relationship be-
tween these concepts and several of the comprehensive law movement’s dis-
ciplines or vectors—those most relevant to the use of apology, forgiveness, 
and reconciliation in the law.  It will explore the practical use of apologies 
and propose a framework for the essential elements of an apology.  Finally, a 
concrete example of a recent apology will be analyzed using this framework, 
demonstrating the potential utility of the framework for lawyers and judges 
seeking to assist litigants in crafting apologies, as they practice and adjudi-
cate comprehensively. 
 
 19. See Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law Movement,” 6 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 1–4 (2006) (introducing the concept of the integration of these vectors 
into a movement) [hereinafter Daicoff/Pepperdine]. 
 20. Id. at 5–9. 
 21. INTERNATIONAL NETWORK ON THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, 
www.law.arizona.edu/depts/upr-intj (therapeutic jurisprudence is described in over 1500 law review 
articles and books listed on this website.). 
 22. Daicoff/Pepperdine, supra note 20, at 3. 
 23. Id. at 5–10. 
4
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol13/iss1/5
[Vol. 13: 131, 2013]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
135 
II.  BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF APOLOGY, FORGIVENESS, AND 
RECONCILIATION 
Apology,24 forgiveness,25 and reconciliation26 can be three steps or com-
ponents of a successful healing experience between individuals, groups, or 
institutions in dispute or conflict.27  While the three disciplines are not nec-
essary to conflict resolution, they can facilitate it or, at the least, be helpful.  
The field of apology-forgiveness-reconciliation research and literature is 
vast,28 and the brief treatment in this article does not do it justice.  However, 
below are some basic, perhaps oversimplified definitions. 
A.   Apology 
Apology occurs when one person who has done something wrong ex-
presses remorse for what he has done, takes responsibility for the action, and 
expresses that he is “sorry.”29  He may also acknowledge the harm done to 
others by his actions and those actions’ impact on others’ lives.30  He may 
 
 24. Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1009–1011 
(May 1999) (arguing for the importance and benefits of apology in legal matters). 
 25. See Frank D. Fincham, Forgiveness: Integral to Close Relationships and Inimical to Jus-
tice?, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 357, 358–59 (2009) (citing Everett L. Worthington, Initial Ques-
tions About the Art and Science of Forgiving, in HANDBOOK OF FORGIVENESS 1, 3 (EVERETT L. 
WORTHINGTON, JR. ed., 2005) to support the concept that “the definition of forgiveness is the major 
issue facing the new science of forgiveness.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Maya Sosnov, The Adjudication of Genocide: Gacaca and the Road to Reconcil-
iation in Rwanda, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 125, 143 (Spring, 2008) (defining reconciliation). 
 27. Erin Ann O’Hara, Group-Conflict Resolution: Sources of Resistance to Reconciliation, 72 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, i–ii (Spring 2009) (apology can help deescalate disputes and for-
giveness and reconciliation can lead to better psychological and physical health and lives for victims, 
for example). 
 28. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, 79 TUL. L. REV. 903 (2005); Jona-
than R. Cohen, The Culture of Legal Denial, 84 NEB. L. REV. 247 (2005); Jonathan R. Cohen, Apol-
ogy and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447 
(2000); Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV.  819 
(2002); Jonathan R. Cohen, Encouraging Apology Improves Lawyering and Dispute Resolution, 18 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 171 (October 2000); Jonathan R. Cohen, Apologizing for Er-
rors, 6 NO. 4 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 16 (Summer 2000); Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apolo-
gize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 (May 1999); and Jonathan R. Cohen, Nagging Problem: Advising the 
Client Who Wants to Apologize, 5 NO. 3 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 19 (Spring 1999). 
 29. Cohen, supra note 25, at 1014–15 (defining apology with three elements: admitting one’s 
fault, expressing regret for one’s behavior, and expressing sympathy for the other’s injury). 
 30. Id. 
5
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also describe his plan or intention not to engage in the behavior again.31  The 
apology should be expressed directly to the person or persons harmed by the 
apologizer’s actions.32  If a face-to-face encounter cannot be accomplished, a 
letter, video, or public statement may be substituted.33  Philosophy professor 
Nick Smith suggests even a social networking internet site, such as Face-
book or Twitter, may be used for the apology’s expression.34  To be well re-
ceived, the apology should be sincere, and the apologizer should take per-
sonal responsibility for his actions, avoiding excuses, justifications, 
rationalizations, arguments, and defensive statements.35  Finally, apologizing 
without changing one’s behavior in the future can be entirely meaningless, 
for both the apologizer and the audience.36  Such an apology is not likely to 
have a rehabilitative or sanative impact on the apologizer, can have an em-
bittering effect on the audience, and is not likely to be viewed as sincere.37  
Smith makes a poignant analogy on this point: if an offender apologizes and 
reoffends right afterwards, it is like someone saying “I love you” on a first 
date.38  One cannot evaluate the sincerity of this statement until one observes 
the speaker’s subsequent behavior.39  Similarly, one cannot evaluate the 
 
 31. Thio Li-ann, Contentious Liberty: Regulating Religious Propagation in a Multi-Religious 
Secular Democracy, 2010 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 484, at text accompanying nn.134–142 (Dec. 2010) 
(highlighting the listener’s need to know that the act would not occur again and the apologizer’s 
promise that it would not recur). 
 32. See, e.g., Gail Pellet, Facing the Truth with Bill Moyers (Public Affairs Television docu-
mentary broadcast on PBS Mar. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Facing the Truth] (on file with the author) (in 
which a murder victim’s mother complains that the offenders’ apology was not made “to me.”) 
 33. Nick Smith, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of New Hampshire, and 
Charles Griswold, Professor of Philosophy, Boston University, Speech at the Interdisciplinary Study 
of Conflict and Dispute Resolution Symposium: Forgiveness: What, When, Why? (Apr. 10, 2009) 
(discussing the elements of an effective apology); see also Nick Smith, Apologies in Law: An Over-
view of the Philosophical Issues, 13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2013). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Based on the author’s experience in an informal mediation conducted by the author, circa 
2003.  See also Li-ann, supra note 32, at text accompanying n.133, noting an apologizer’s “responsi-
ble, repentant attitude” as “worthy of note” because it helped deescalate tensions between the fac-
tions in conflict. 
 36. Nick Smith, Against Court-Ordered Apologies, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 43 (2013) [here-
inafter Smith, Court-Ordered], citing Ma Bik Yung v. Ko Chuen, CACV 267/99, 9 (2000) (stating 
“the Hong Kong Court of Appeals explained in the context of a disability discrimination claim that if 
a defendant is not ‘contrite or repentant,’ requiring him to apologize ‘would be nothing more than a 
meaningless and empty gesture and it should not have been ordered as it would not . . . have consti-
tuted redress to the plaintiff’s loss and damage . . . ‘“). 
 37. See generally the discussion at Smith, Court-Ordered, supra note 37, at 40-49 (arguing that 
a voluntary apology has potential for “far greater benefits” to the offender, society, and the victim, in 
comparison to court-ordered, coerced apologies). 
 38. Smith, supra note 34. 
 39. Smith, supra note 34.  See also Smith Court-Ordered, supra note 37, at 15 (discussing 
what he views as “what seems most absent from and needed in current criminal processes: the genu-
6
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quality of an apology until one observes how the offender behaves after-
wards.40 
Most of these elements are illustrated in the following example provided 
by law professor Thio Li-ann.41  After official complaints regarding the ac-
tions in Singapore of Christian pastor Rony Tan denigrating Buddhism and 
Taoism in three videos posted on his church’s website and later reposted on 
other internet sites such as Facebook and Youtube, Pastor Tan made a per-
sonal apology in personal visits to the Singapore Buddhist Foundation (SBF) 
and the Taoist Federation.42  In his apology, he exhibited a “repentant, re-
sponsible attitude,” “publicly admitted wrongdoing,” expressed “remorse 
that his comments had saddened and hurt Buddhists and Taoists,” and 
“promised it would never happen again.”43  He also removed the offensive 
material, reviewed the church’s remaining materials and removed any other 
potentially offensive material, urged his congregants not to circulate past 
sermons that might be offensive, and took responsibility in a statement to his 
congregation, stating that he would “redeem [him]self by promoting reli-
gious harmony, while still doing the good works of Christ effectively.”44  Li-
ann notes the efficacy of this apology and its ability to “decelerate tensions” 
between the groups.45 
B.   Forgiveness 
Forgiveness occurs when persons harmed by the apologizer’s actions 
accept the apology, express that they are no longer angry with the apologiz-
er, or extend mercy to the apologizer.46  Often, the person harmed first wants 
a chance to describe the harm that was done to him by the apologizer’s ac-
 
ine moral transformation of offenders”); Douglas H. Yarn & Gregory Todd Jones, A Biological Ap-
proach To Understanding Resistance To Apology, Forgiveness, And Reconciliation In Group Con-
flict, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 70 (2009) (arguing that assurances that the offender will not re-
peat the offending behavior are related to perceptions of the sincerity of the apology, which both can 
then lead to the parties’ reconciliation). 
 40. Smith, supra note 34. 
 41. Li-ann, supra note 32; see infra at text accompanying nn.128–146. 
 42. Li-ann, supra note 32; see infra text accompanying nn.128–146. 
 43. Li-ann, supra note 32; see infra text accompanying nn.133–140. 
 44. Li-ann, supra note 32; see infra text accompanying nn.139–140. 
 45. Li-ann, supra note 32; see infra text accompanying n.133. 
 46. Cohen defines it as “cessation of resentment against the offender.”  Cohen, supra note 25, 
at 1015.  See also Fincham, supra note 26, at 362 (noting that “a defining feature of forgiveness is 
the foreswearing of resentment”). 
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tions.47  The person harmed may also want an opportunity to ask questions 
of the actor, such as “Why me?” or “Why did you do what you did?” and re-
ceive answers from the apologizer.48  It is more than simply listening to or 
hearing the apology; forgiveness involves some expression of acceptance of 
the apology by the victim.49 
When the apology–forgiveness exchange occurs between the wrongdoer 
and the wronged person(s), there can be a palpable shift in the atmosphere of 
the room, encounter, or relationship between them.50  Initially, the atmos-
phere can be fraught with tension, anger, and resistance.  After a successful 
apology–forgiveness exchange, this may be replaced with calm, peace, and a 
sense of “flow.”51  There can be humor, a more lighthearted exchange, and 
even collaboration between the parties to solve the problem of how to repair 
the harm done and prevent recurrences of the behavior in the future.52 
In response to Pastor Tan’s apology described above, the president of 
the SBF said, “We accepted his apology, but we also hope these things will 
not happen in the future.”53  The SBF and the Taoist Federation issued a 
joint statement accepting his apology, hoping “he has learnt a lesson from 
this experience,” and promising to “stay in touch to work on promoting mu-
tual understanding between us.”54  The government needed no further action, 
and commentator Li-ann concluded, “Accepting a public apology is indeed a 
responsible, if not graceful response, standing in sharp contrast with post-
apology irate demands of certain netizens to arrest and jail the pastor.”55 
 
 47. HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 14–15 (2002) (explaining 
that victims need four things: information, truth-telling, empowerment, and restitution or vindica-
tion). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Li-ann, supra note 32; see infra at text accompanying nn.142–143 (where the victims is-
sued a joint public statement accepting the offender’s apology and promising to work together in the 
future to “promote mutual understanding.”) 
 50. Thomas J. Scheff, Community Conferences: Shame and Anger in Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 97, 103–04 (1998) (noting that, after this shift, the tension in the room is 
decreased and the settlement that develops is mutually satisfactory to both parties; it does not feel 
arbitrary, punitive, or lenient). 
 51. See O’Hara, supra note 28, at i–ii (noting that apologies can deescalate the conflict be-
tween parties). 
 52. Regarding this “shift,” see Scheff, supra note 51, at 103–04 (the offender’s heartfelt apol-
ogy “drained away the tension in the room, so that the settlement that was reached seemed satisfying 
and inevitable”).  Scheff reports that in three of nine cases that he observed, the shift occurred after 
the formal end of the conference, while the parties were departing the building or waiting to sign 
forms.  Id. 
 53. Li-ann, supra note 32; see infra at text accompanying nn.141–142. 
 54. Li-ann, supra note 32; see infra at text accompanying nn.142–143. 
 55. Li-ann, supra note 32; see infra at text accompanying n.148. 
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C.   Reconciliation 
After apology and forgiveness, reconciliation may or may not occur.  
Reconciliation is present when the apologizer and the person harmed move 
away from an adversarial stance of anger, blame, shame, and resentment, 
towards a mutual appreciation of each other and perhaps a sort of peace, or 
harmony, between them.56  Notre Dame Law School Dean Emeritus David 
T. Link has described “vertical harmony” and “horizontal harmony” as pos-
sible outcomes of dispute resolution processes.  Horizontal harmony refers 
to harmony between disputing parties, between people in a community, or 
between a criminal offender and the relevant community; vertical harmony 
refers to the offender or apologizer being reconciled with and to his Creator 
or God.57 
In the Singaporean example described above, Li-ann references recon-
ciliation as a possible outcome of the apology–forgiveness exchange in 
claiming that the “reconciliatory posture” adopted by the Buddhist and Tao-
ist leaders may promote “empathy and reconciliation” and is “essential to 
long-term or durable peace.”58  Li-ann asserts that their tolerance and for-
giveness towards an offender who shows “genuine contrition . . . paves the 
path towards genuine reconciliation”59 and notes the particular importance of 
these concepts in conflicts between religious groups in a multi-religious en-
vironment.60 
 
 56. See, e.g., Sosnov, supra note 27, at 143 (defining reconciliation as anew relationship of 
acceptance and trust or a process by which parties in conflict “move to attain or to restore a relation-
ship that they believe to be minimally acceptable”). 
 57. Definition attributed to Dean Emeritus David T. Link, former dean of Notre Dame Law 
School and former president of the International Centre for Healing and the Law (personal commu-
nication with author, circa 2003).  See David Link, FORBES, http://people.forbes.com/profile/david-t-
link/72392.  See also James M. Cooper, Jurist Voices (McGill Center for Creative Problem Solving, 
California Western School of Law, 2000) (citing Judge Robert Yazzie, Hozho Nahasdlii—We Are 
Now In Good Relations: Navajo Restorative Justice, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 117, 124 (1996) (the 
title means “may the good way be restored”)) (includes comments by the Hon. Ray Austin, former 
justice on the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, and by the Hon. Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice of the 
Navajo Nation, describing the Navajo peacemaking process). 
 58. Li-ann, supra note 32, see infra at text accompanying nn.177–82. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See generally id.; see also infra nn.177–82 and accompanying text. 
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D.   The “Core Sequence” 
Sociology professor Thomas Scheff calls apology and forgiveness the 
“core sequence”61 of resolving conflicts, suggesting that dispute resolvers 
should learn how to facilitate it.  He explains that material reparation—the 
payment of money or compensation, for example—and symbolic reparations 
are both important goals of mediations in criminal cases in Australia.62  For 
symbolic reparation to occur, the two steps of apology and forgiveness, or 
core sequence, must occur.63  The core sequence should be relevant in both 
civil and criminal cases.  In civil cases, however, there could be reciprocal 
apologies made and accepted between the parties.  In criminal cases, an 
apology is usually only sought from the offender.64  While conflict resolu-
tion usually proceeds most smoothly when this entire sequence is present,65 
the entire sequence is not required in order to resolve conflict.  Conflict reso-
lution can occur without any of the following: apology, forgiveness, or rec-
onciliation.  For example, conflicts often resolve without an apology.66  
Apologies may be given without forgiveness received in return and without 
reconciliation between the parties.67  Reconciliation may or may not occur 
after apology is given and forgiveness extended.  Because of the optional 
 
 61. Scheff, supra note 51, at 102–04. 
 62. Id. at 101–02. 
 63. Id. at 102. 
 64. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbenolt, Apologies and Reasonableness: Some Implications of 
Psychology for Torts, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 489, 493 (2010) (apologies can “elicit favorable recipro-
cal responses” and cause more positive perceptions of the other party); Amy L. Lieberman, The 
Driving Force of Desires, 44 Aug ARIZ. ATT’Y 18, 20 (2008) (stating that “[a]pologies typically 
generate reciprocal behavior” such as “[d]eep gratitude” or a “reciprocal apology”).  In restorative 
justice, apology is usually only sought from the criminal offender.  ZEHR, supra note 48, at 8–18. 
 65. Lieberman, supra note 65, at 20 (providing an example where apology opened the door to 
resolution). 
 66. Deborah L. Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1196 (1997) 
[hereinafter Levi] (for example, Levi relates a divorce mediation that was settled without “full for-
mal apology;” the parties did, however, express regret for the impact of their actions on the other but 
did not experience remorse for their actions.  They did not submit “to alien norms”). 
 67. See, e.g., Matthew Kekoa Keiley, Ensuring Our Future by Protecting Our Past: An Indig-
enous Reconciliation Approach to Improving Native Hawaiian Burial Protection, 33 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 321, 352 n.281, 353 (2011) (noting that insincere or hollow apologies are ineffective in bring-
ing about, and do not alter the parties’ relationship sufficiently to bring about, enduring forgiveness); 
Olivera Simic, Bringing “Justice” Home? Bosnians, War Criminals and the Interaction Between the 
Cosmopolitan and the Local, 12 GER. L.J. 1388, 1401–02 (2011) (reconciliation is “one of the most 
challenging parts of peace building” and may not result if the apology does not contain sincere re-
morse). 
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character of reconciliation,68 in the remainder of this article, “core sequence” 
shall refer to apology and forgiveness, where reconciliation may or may not 
thereafter occur. 
E.   Something Intangible 
In addition to all of the elements and components listed above, there is 
something intangible that seems to be present in a good core sequence.  One 
might imagine that fostering a core sequence in a particular case is like mak-
ing soup: anyone can boil all of the listed ingredients of the soup (e.g., 
chicken, water, salt, onion, celery, carrots, and rice) in a pot on the stove, but 
different people’s chicken soups taste differently.  Some say it is because 
they include a special ingredient, some say they boil it a certain way for a 
certain time period, and others say their soup is made with good intentions 
or love.69  There seems to be an intangible element in an effective exchange 
of apology and forgiveness between a plaintiff and defendant or between 
victim and offender, relating perhaps to the sincerity of the parties, the hum-
ble attitude in their interactions with each other, the expressed, nonverbal 
emotions displayed by both, the eye contact between them, and the like.  
There is a distinct shift in the interchange between the parties, or in the “cli-
mate” in the room, when the core sequence works and an apology is accept-
ed.70  The climate of interaction between the parties changes and becomes 
warmer, less adversarial, and more relaxed.71 
For example, in one mediation observed by the author, the victim re-
fused to accept the offender’s apology until the offender broke down, crying, 
and tearfully and believably explained why the offender committed the of-
fense, admitting to very vulnerable and tender feelings of fear and inadequa-
cy in the process.  After that, the dispute resolved very quickly as the victim 
 
 68. For example, Sosnov, supra note 27, at 143, notes that reconciliation is not easy to 
achieve, between parties in conflict, and proposes a more realistic definition of reconciliation; see 
also Sosnov, supra note 57. 
 69. For example, my son says his mother’s soup tastes better than canned soup or soup from a 
boxed mix. 
 70. Levi, supra note 67, at 1196 (noting that accepted apologies will shift the adversarial cli-
mate between parties, change the parties’ demeanors, and result in a warmer, more relaxed interac-
tion between them) (citing JOSEPH FOLGER & MARSHALL SCOTT POOLE, WORKING THROUGH 
CONFLICT: A COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE 99 (1984) (for the term “climate” to describe the par-
ties’ interaction)). 
 71. Id. (citing FOLGER & POOLE, supra note 67, at 99). 
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easily worked with the mediator and offender to create a mediated resolution 
of the offender’s sentence.72  Lieberman relates a similar example.  She says: 
In a recent case, I sensed that the parties could not move on until they 
believed the other truly realized the impact on each other’s lives of the 
events of the underlying case.  With the lawyers’ permission, I asked both 
parties to meet with me alone, without their lawyers, for a facilitated discus-
sion.  Though anxious about doing so, they agreed.  Both cried for a good 
hour, while they explained the impact the other’s actions had on their lives.  
They communicated the frustrations they felt, and each volunteered that in 
hindsight they would have handled it differently.  One apology led to a re-
ciprocal apology, and this allowed the negotiations to begin.73 
A shift may occur in both parties.  In the victim, the shift is from anger 
to acceptance to openness.74  In the offender, the shift is from defensiveness 
and shame to openness, humility, and acceptance of responsibility.75  There 
is often an underlying, explicit or implicit, mutual recognition: “We are both 
human, no one is perfect, we are co-members of the human race, we are both 
human beings worthy of value, and there is some commonality between us.”  
Perhaps the victim would not have done what the offender did, but he now 
understands why it was done and has some empathy for the offender; simi-
larly, the offender has empathy for what the victim has experienced as a re-
sult of the offense.76 
On the other hand, this intangible component may be as simple as an 
examination of the apologizer’s sincerity,77 which may be further decon-
structed into his motives for making the apology.  Sincerity may appear to 
be present when the apologizer is truly sorry for what he has done and how 
 
 72. Based on the author’s experience observing an informal mediation, circa 2003. 
 73. Lieberman, supra note 65, at 20 (also stating that “[o]nce that need [for acknowledgement] 
is met, the door is opened for resolution.”) 
 74. See R. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 8–13 (1994) 
[hereinafter BUSH & FOLGER (1994)] (in the “Sensitive Bully” case, illustrating this awareness of the 
other’s plight as “recognition” and depicting similar shifts that occur in successful transformative 
mediations). 
 75. Scheff, supra note 51, at 109 (the offender needs to “be in a state of ‘perfect defenseless-
ness’”). 
 76. BUSH & FOLGER (1994), supra note 75, at 89–94, refer to this mutual understanding as 
“recognition” and propose it as one explicit goal of transformative mediation. 
 77. See, e.g., David Hoffman, Mediation, Multiple Minds, and Managing the Negotiation 
Within, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 297, 300 (2011) (relating a story in which a party in mediation 
responded to the mediator’s inquiry about what might fulfill her desire for vindication, which was 
blocking her willingness to settle an intrafamily dispute (“‘An apology might do it,’ she said, ‘if it 
was sincere.’  She pondered a moment longer and said, with a wry smile, “Yes, a totally abject apol-
ogy might do it.’”)). 
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he has harmed others, and when he expresses those sentiments.78  If, howev-
er, this motive is absent or is mixed with self-serving motives, the apology 
may be less successful for both the apologizer and the audience, though this 
is debatable; some believe even insincere apologies can have a positive ef-
fect.79  Self-serving motives might include apologizing for the purposes of 
gaining leniency in court from a third-party decision-maker, persuading the 
other party to drop the lawsuit or settle it on terms favorable to the apologiz-
er, appearing more noble or rehabilitated to others, or generally gaining any 
kind of favor or praise for the apologizer.80 
III.  BENEFITS OF APOLOGY, FOREGIVENESS, AND 
RECONCILIATION 
Guilt, shame, anger, and grief are often present in civil and criminal le-
gal matters.81  Wrongdoers in legal matters often can benefit from rehabili-
tating or not recidivating.82  Apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation can 
have great benefits by reducing these negative emotions and improving the 
potential for individual reform.  Thus, they can maximize the therapeutic as-
pects of legal matters and minimize the anti-therapeutic ones for wrongdoers 
and affected persons alike.83  This section will examine several social sci-
ence findings in each of these areas and explore how the use of apologies 
can be beneficial to the parties involved. 
 
 78. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Well Excuse Me!—Remorse, Apology, and Criminal Sentencing, 38 
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 371, 383 (2006) (describing the elements of a sincere apology). 
 79. See, e.g., the lively discussion of sincerity in Murphy, supra note 79, at 383–84 (exploring 
what makes a sincere apology and the possible constructive effects of insincere apologies, such as 
public admission of and acceptance of accountability for the harm done or action taken and venge-
ance fulfillment in the public shaming of the offender). 
 80. See, e.g., Simic, supra note 68, at 1401 (apology can be used to maneuver towards 
dropped charges and may not be motivated by true remorse); Levi, supra note 67, at n.11 (while ad-
vocating for the use of apology: “This is not to suggest that lawyers should tutor their clients in ma-
nipulating opponents’ emotions—sincere regret is different from tactical apology”). 
 81. Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Competence and the Lawyer’s Journey, in SILVER, supra 
note 7, at 14–15, 29–35 (discussing grief, anger, shame, humiliation, and denial and the need for 
lawyers to respond appropriately thereto). 
 82. See generally David B. Wexler, Relapse Prevention Planning Principles for Criminal Law 
Practice, in PTJ, supra note 19, at 237–43 (exploring how lawyers and courts can assist criminal 
clients in avoiding recividism). 
 83. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick & Alina M. Perez, Aging, Driving, and Public Health: A Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence Approach, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 189, n.242 (2010) (noting that an apolo-
gy can foster healing for victims and offenders in criminal actions). 
13
Daicoff: Apology, Forgiveness, Reconciliation & Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 144 
A.  Fostering Therapeutic Guilt (Reintegrative Shame) 
Mental health professionals often differentiate between guilt and shame 
as follows: guilt is an expression that “I have done something wrong”; 
shame expresses, “I am wrong, and there is something wrong with or defec-
tive about me.”84  Guilt allows for the possibility that the wrongdoer is a 
good person, worthy of esteem, who has committed a wrong act that can be 
avoided in the future.85  Guilt, therefore, can be therapeutic in that it may 
motivate one to change, when one has committed a wrong.  In contrast, 
shame suggests that the wrongdoer is not worthy of esteem or not capable of 
changing.  John Braithwaite refers to the difference between guilt and shame 
as the distinction between two types of shame: shame that condemns offend-
ers’ behavior but motivates them to change, or “reintegrative shame,” and 
shame that stigmatizes offenders, perhaps causing them to feel alienated and 
outcast and thus to re-offend.86  Reintegrative shame is linked to accepting 
personal accountability, responsibility, and willingness to change; and it can 
be therapeutic, if used properly or facilitated in criminal law, as it can moti-
vate the wrongdoer to change.87  Sociology professor Thomas Scheff ex-
plains that apologies facilitate “reintegrative shame,” which is sanative, as 
opposed to unhealthy shame.88 
This is particularly true when apologies are made publicly.89  Scheff as-
serts that they have the greatest effect on offenders and victims when there is 
a public commitment or apology made by the offender directly (in person) to 
the victims, the affected community, or both.90  This is consistent with other 
social science research by Meichenbaum and Turk demonstrating, in the 
 
 84. Popular psychologist and author John Bradshaw explained in 1988 that “[g]uilt says I’ve 
done something wrong; shame says there is something wrong with me . . . Guilt says I’ve made a 
mistake; shame says I am a mistake . . . Guilt says what I did was not good; shame says I am no 
good.”  JOHN BRADSHAW, BRADSHAW ON THE FAMILY:  A REVOLUTIONARY WAY OF SELF 
DISCOVERY (Health Communications: Deerfield Beach, Florida 1988) (emphases in original). 
 85. Scheff, supra note 51, at 104–06.  Victoria Pynchon, Shame by Any Other Name: Lessons 
for Restorative Justice from the Principles, Traditions, and Practices of Alcoholics Anonymous, 5 
PEPP. L.  REV. 299, 304 (2005) (providing a chart differentiating guilt from shame). 
 86. See Pynchon, supra note 86, at 300 (citing John Braithwaite, Shame and Criminal Justice, 
42 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 281, 281–82 (2000)). 
 87. Scheff, supra note 51, at 104–06; Pynchon, supra note 86, at 307 (noting the positive ef-
fect of guilt, or reintegrative shame, on the offender). 
 88. Scheff, supra note 51, at 104–07. 
 89. Murphy, supra note 79, at 383–84 (noting that even a public apology is a public admission 
of responsibility, even if it is insincere). 
 90. Scheff, supra note 51, at 104–10; see also Li-ann, supra note 32, at 503–04 (noting the 
public aspects of Pastor Tan’s apology). 
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context of patient health care compliance, that changed behavior is more 
likely to result when the actor makes a public commitment.91 
 
B.   Reducing Anger 
 
Anger is often present in litigants, whether the case is criminal or civil.92  
Further, the traditional legal system’s emphasis on adversarialism may tend 
to prolong or foster hostility between parties.93  While anger may be benefi-
cial as a motivator for action and change,94 it can also be countertherapeutic 
in legal matters.95  Robin Wellford Slocum explains that “anger becomes a 
problem when it is not released after it has served its limited purpose but is 
instead allowed to simmer and fester,” leaving the client with resentment, 
suffering, and bitterness.96  For example, law professor Solangel Maldonado 
has documented at length the deleterious effects of anger on children, post-
 
 91. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, in DAVID B. 
WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, EDS., LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY 167 (1996) [hereinafter KEY], 
citing DONALD MEICHENBAUM & DENNIS C. TURK, FACILITATING TREATMENT ADHERENCE: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDEBOOK (1987).  Bruce Winick discusses the application of this research in 
criminal lawyering in Chapter 10 of PTJ, supra note 19. 
 92. See generally Paul A. Batista, Civil RICO Practice Manual, Chapter 1: Introduction and 
Overview, Current through the 2011 Supplement, Section 1.05, Overview of the Defense Perspective 
(RICO defendants often react with anger to complaints involving racketeering allegations); Thomas 
F. Villeneuve and Robert V. Gunderson Jr., Corp. Partnering: Structuring and Negotiating Domestic 
and International Strategic Alliances, Part I: Corporate Partnering/Strategic Alliances, Current 
through the 2010 Supplement, Chapter 1: Structuring and Negotiating Corporate Alliances (discuss-
ing how the “heat of anger” can instigate litigation and corporate deadlocks); Aspen Publishers, 
Handbook of Intellectual Property Claims & Remedies, Chapter 1. Deciding Whether To Bring An 
Intellectual Property Lawsuit, Current through the 2011 Supplement, § 1.02, The Decision to Liti-
gate (acknowledging that clients in commercial disputes may litigate because of “frustration or an-
ger” rather than “commercial business realities”). 
 93. See, e.g., Connie J. A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical Reappraisal of Divorce Media-
tion Research and Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 989, 1021 (2000) (the competitive atmos-
phere of litigation may foster “anger, depression, frustration, and worry” in divorcing parents, as 
compared to mediation). 
 94. Robin Wellford Slocum, The Dilemma of the Vengeful Client: A Prescriptive Framework 
for Cooling the Flames of Anger, 92 MARQ.  L. REV. 481, 488 (2009) (observing that anger can be 
positive and healthy, as it can motivate individuals to change and action, for example, to “right a 
social injustice,” and also noting the potential for lawyers to help “clients use the legal system to 
effect such change”). 
 95. Id. at 488. 
 96. Id. at 488 (noting also that angry clients can be found in any lawyer’s office, not just in 
family lawyers’ offices). 
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divorce.97  Similarly, Katherine Maxwell summarizes empirical research 
finding that interparental conflict is one of the top three causes of poor post-
divorce functioning and mental health among children.98  Anger in divorcing 
spouses likely contributes to interparental conflict.  However, it is not only 
children and parents in divorce who may experience deleterious anger, dur-
ing and after litigation.  All civil and criminal litigants (and crime victims) 
may experience deleterious anger (and also, possibly, dissatisfaction with 
their legal counsel), leading to their poor functioning and mental health, 
post-litigation.99 
Scheff asserts that this grief and anger are often unacknowledged emo-
tions and may appear in the form of moral indignation and lecturing behav-
ior.100  He explains that individuals who are experiencing great fear or grief 
often transmute those tender, vulnerable feelings into anger and indignation 
at others, which they may express in the form of “lecturing.”101  For exam-
ple, the victim of a traffic accident might lecture the other driver (e.g., “You 
need to learn how to be more careful.  You can’t keep tearing around town 
with no regard for others!”).  Scheff suggests that a skilled mediator might 
gently question the angry person to allow the underlying feelings of fear, be-
trayal, and loss to surface, instead (e.g., perhaps, “I was terrified when your 
car hit mine and I don’t know when I’ll ever be able to go back to work 
again”).102 
Working through and letting go of this anger may be therapeutic for 
many clients.  For example, Slocum argues that “[t]here is, within every 
vengeful client, a longing for healing . . . [and] to be freed of the anger that 
is poisoning his quality of life.”103  Slocum counsels lawyers to learn to as-
sist clients in releasing such vengeful anger, in order to assist their clients in 
gaining the quality of life they desire.104  She relates “letting go of anger” to 
the concept of forgiveness, noting that they may be the same or similar, but 
clarifies that the client need not “condone the other party’s conduct, forget 
 
 97. Solangel Maldonado, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School, Speech at the 
Interdisciplinary Study of Conflict and Dispute Resolution Symposium: Forgiveness in the Context 
of Family Law: “Healing Divorce” (Apr. 10, 2009); see also Solangel Maldonado, Facilitating For-
giveness and Reconciliation in “Good Enough” Marriages, 13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 102 (2013). 
 98. Kathryn E. Maxwell, Preventive Lawyering Strategies to Mitigate the Detrimental Effects 
of Client’s Divorces on Their Children, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 137 (1998). 
 
 99. See supra notes 92–94. 
 100. Scheff, supra note 51, at 112–14. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 111. 
 103. Slocum, supra note 95, at 508. 
 104. Id. at 508–33 (exploring at length strategies for lawyers in this situation). 
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what happened, or seek to reconcile with the other party.”105  This echoes the 
assertions above that apology may occur with or without forgiveness and 
reconciliation; they are not necessarily companions.  Further, Slocum sum-
marizes studies establishing physiological and psychological benefits of re-
leasing anger through forgiveness.106  Therefore, to the extent that apologies 
and forgiveness, if given, assist litigants in releasing anger, they are likely to 
be helpful. 
Even if an apology is given and accepted, it may have deficiencies.  For 
example, the importance of direct apologies is underscored in a poignant in-
terview of the mother of a victim tortured and killed as a result of apartheid 
in South Africa.  In the 1999 documentary titled Facing the Truth With Bill 
Moyers, about the public hearings held by the South African Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission, she says justice was not done.107  Even though the 
hearings brought the offenders before the victims in a public forum to take 
responsibility for their actions, she was dissatisfied.  When asked why, she 
emphatically expressed, “[T]hey should have apologized to me, to me, . . . 
first to me, and then to God.”108  There was something too impersonal about 
the large, public hearings for this victim’s mother. 
Apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation, if elicited carefully, can dra-
matically reduce litigation-related anger.109  This reduction in anger may 
thus improve the post-litigation functioning of the involved persons, particu-
larly civil plaintiffs and criminal victims who felt harmed by the acts leading 
to litigation or those who will suffer from prolonged anger in the litigants, 
such as the children of divorcing spouses.110 
 
 105. Id. at 529.   
 106. Id. at 531–32 (documenting health benefits such as decreased stress and improved cardio-
vascular and nervous system functioning; psychological benefits such as regaining one’s personal 
power). 
 107. Facing the Truth, supra note 33. 
 108. Facing the Truth, supra note 33. 
 109. See Slocum, supra note 95, at 529–32. 
 110. See Maldonado, supra note 98; Maxwell, supra note 99.  See also Slocum, supra note 95, 
at 529–32. 
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C.   Moving Through The Grief Process: “DABDA” 
Anger is one of the five stages of the grief process as documented by the 
psychologist Elisabeth Kübler-Ross: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, 
and acceptance.111  As I have elsewhere observed: 
Almost every litigant engaging an attorney has suffered a loss of some 
sort.  Thus, a litigant is likely to be experiencing one or more of Elisabeth 
Kübler-Ross’ famous five stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depres-
sion, and acceptance. 
Litigation can facilitate or suspend the grief process—the process of 
dealing with and resolving the loss that resulted in the legal problem.  For 
example, in wrongful death actions, litigation can interrupt the process of 
grieving if it focuses too long on the cause of or responsibility for the death.  
On the other hand, “litigation . . . facilitate[s] the . . . grief process” when it 
helps the survivors sort out the events leading to the death or “fulfill[s] their 
sense of duty to the deceased” person and is begun and concluded in a time-
ly way  after the death.112 
In every lawsuit, something has been lost, torn, ruptured, or broken, 
whether it involves a criminal charge or offense, civil wrong, personal inju-
ry, or even breach of contract.  The loss may be a physical loss, economic 
loss, the loss of a relationship, or the loss of the person’s status in society 
and inclusion with others.  Attorneys need to be aware that their clients are 
likely experiencing one of the five stages—civil plaintiffs perhaps most of-
ten “anger” and criminal defendants perhaps often “denial,” “bargaining,” or 
“depression.”113  As attorneys, we can prolong these stages and hamper an 
individual’s progression through them, intensify the manifestations of each 
stage (particularly anger or denial) or help facilitate the process of resolving 
grief for our clients.114  By its emphasis on assigning blame, finding fault, 
 
 111. ELISABETH KÜBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING 34–99 (1969) (discussing the five 
stages of coping in terminally ill patients). 
 
 112. Daicoff/Pepperdine, supra note 20, at 54–55 (quoting Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology 
of Compensation in Tort Law, in KEY, supra note 92, at 452–53) (citations omitted). 
 113. The criminal defendant has experienced a loss of social status, in being charged with a 
crime, and either denies it (“I didn’t do it, I’m not to blame, and if I did do it, I’m not responsible”) 
or bargaining (“Maybe this won’t turn out that badly for me”) or depression (“This is the worst thing 
ever to happen to me!”).  If the criminal defendant is engaged in a life of crime, the charges end that 
spree, so to speak, so it is a loss of the unfettered ability to engage in criminal activity.  I am particu-
larly thinking of criminal defendants whose crimes are fueled by their own substance abuse.  See, 
e.g., Abbe Smith, “I Ain’t Takin’ No Plea”: The Challenges in Counseling Young People Facing 
Serious Time, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 28–30 (2007) (noting the widespread awareness among crim-
inal defense attorneys that their clients are progressing through Kubler-Ross’s five stages of grief). 
 114. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 114, at 28–30 (noting that criminal defense counsel must know 
that defendants must reach the acceptance stage before a guilty plea can be entered); Bruce J. Win-
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and appearing personally blameless, the adversarial process encourages liti-
gants to remain angry with others and may prolong or arrest the natural pro-
cess of grief resolution for them.  This may, in turn, result in deferring the 
litigants’ resolution of the loss, or “closure.”115 
In contrast, allowing litigants or crime victims to be heard116 and to ex-
press anger, and allowing offenders to express shame, remorse, and ask for 
forgiveness117 may facilitate the parties’ movement through the grief process 
towards acceptance and resolution.  It may provide or foster “closure” for 
both parties, for the events of the past.118 
D.   Making Restitution to Those Harmed 
Apology alone can begin to restore to the harmed person what was taken 
away by the apologizer’s acts.  For example, a criminal offense can be anal-
ogized to the offender taking a figurative “bite” out of the victim.  Due to the 
offense, the victim can be disfigured and the offender can be shamed, out-
cast, and alienated from society, labeled as a “biter.”  A restorative justice 
process119 focused on apology cannot restore the original flesh to the 
wound—nothing can ever do that, and a scar will always remain—but it can 
begin to fill the hole left by the offender’s bite.  It fills this void with a pros-
thesis—something new—an exchange between the victim and the offender 
that can improve the victim’s state, repair some of the damage done to the 
victim by the event, and leave the offender with reintegrative shame rather 
than guilt.  Ultimately, the process aims to allow both to re-enter society as 
whole people.  It fills what Julie Exline calls the “injustice gap”—the gap 
 
ick, Client Denial and Resistance in the Advance Directive Context: Reflections on How Attorneys 
Can Identify and Deal With a Psycholegal Soft Spot, in PTJ, supra note 19, at 330–49 (discussing 
the psychological concepts of denial and resistance in clients dealing with end-of-life issues and how 
attorneys can assist clients to move through those stages into a more productive mode). 
 115. Daicoff/Pepperdine, supra note 20, at 54–55. 
 116. Procedural justice demonstrates that litigant satisfaction with legal processes depends in 
large part on whether they are given a chance to be heard.  Tom Tyler, The Psychological Conse-
quences of Judicial Procedure, in KEY, supra note 92. 
 117. Zehr, supra note 48, at 8–12 (noting offenders’ needs in restorative justice processes). 
 118. Cf. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Grief, Procedure, and Justice: The September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 466–67 (2003) (noting that litigation or settlement of 
the lawsuit or claim alone does not always provide closure). 
 119. HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 27–29 (GERRY JOHNSTONE & DANIEL W. VAN 
NESS eds., 2007). 
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between what actually happened and what seems fair120—by providing sym-
bolic and material restitution to those harmed by the wrongdoing.121  The of-
fender’s apology can be an important part of that process, where the offender 
takes full responsibility for the offense and acknowledges the impact of the 
offense on the victim. Scheff explains this as follows: 
[In the core sequence,] two separate movements of shame should 
occur.  First, all shame must be removed from the victim.  The hu-
miliation of degradation, betrayal, and violation that has been in-
flicted on the victim must be relieved.  This step is a key element in 
the victim’s future well-being; it is the shame component—the vic-
tim’s feeling that if only he or she had acted differently, the crime 
wouldn’t have occurred or would have been less painful—that leads 
to the most intense and protracted suffering. . . . 
The removal of shame from the victim is accomplished by the sec-
ond move: making sure that all of the shame connected with the 
crime is accepted by the offender.  By acknowledging his or her 
complete responsibility for the crime, the offender not only takes 
the first step toward rehabilitation, but also eases the suffering of 
the victim.  For the shaming of the offender to be reintegrative, 
however, the facilitator must take care that it not be excessive, as al-
ready indicated.  Humiliating the offender in [a victim/offender] 
conference makes it almost impossible for him both to accept re-
sponsibility and to help remove shame from the victim.  By recog-
nizing and encouraging the core sequence of emotions, as described 
below, an effective facilitator can direct the offender toward reha-
bilitation and help relieve the victim’s suffering.122 
E.   Summary of Therapeutic Aspects of Apology, Forgiveness and 
Reconciliation 
Apology serves many purposes.  It can begin to restore or heal the 
wound or loss visited upon the victim of crime.123  It can place all blame for 
the event on the offender and remove all blame from the victim.124  It can be 
part of the offender’s responsibility-taking actions, fostering healthy guilt or 
reintegrative shame in the offender, ultimately allowing him to be reintegrat-
 
 120. Julie Exline, Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve Univ., Panel Discussion at the 
Interdisciplinary Study of Conflict and Dispute Resolution Symposium: The Thorny Issue of For-
giveness: A Psychological Perspective (Apr. 10, 2009). 
 121. JOHNSTONE & VAN NESS, supra note 120, at 27–29. 
 122. Scheff, supra note 51, at 105–06 (also noting that the usual court process does little to re-
lieve the victim’s suffering). 
 123. Id. at 105. 
 124. Id. 
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ed into society.125  It is often the one thing civil clients say they want in liti-
gation.126  It can facilitate the progress of parties through the stages of grief, 
ultimately arriving at resolution.127  Perhaps most importantly, many litigants 
and crime victims will not be satisfied or be at peace with the legal outcome 
of a case unless and until a sincere apology is provided to them by the de-
fendant.128  They may accept the outcome facially, but deep peace—a deep 
sense of closure, healing, reconciliation, and justice—is not likely to be pre-
sent without the apology.129 
While they are not necessary ingredients of many of the vectors of the 
comprehensive law movement, apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation fur-
ther the goals of many vectors of that movement.  The next section explores 
how. 
IV.  RELEVANCE TO VECTORS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LAW 
MOVEMENT  
A new movement in the law, towards law as a healing profession, has 
emerged over the last two decades.130  Its growth is due perhaps in part to 
dissatisfaction with the traditional legal system but also in part to various 
shifts in societal, collective thought.131  For example, three such shifts are: 
(1) individuals, groups, and even countries now recognize their intercon-
nectedness and the interdependence of their wellbeing (i.e., “If I hurt you, it 
 
 125. Pynchon, supra note 86, at 300 (citing John Braithwaite, Shame and Criminal Justice, 42 
CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 281, 281–82 (2000)). 
 126. A CIVIL ACTION (Touchstone Pictures 1998) (in which the plaintiffs in a toxic tort case 
reiterate their desire for an apology from the defendant corporations, despite a monetary settlement, 
and express their displeasure with receiving a monetary amount alone).  See Jennifer K. Robbenolt, 
Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349, 358–59 (noting 
studies demonstrating the importance of apologies to civil claimants and asserting that people desire 
apologies when injured by another). 
 127. See generally KÜBLER-ROSS, supra note 112. 
 128. See Robbenolt, supra note 124, at 381, 391 (attorneys advising their clients against apolo-
gizing can impede settling the case to the client’s “best satisfaction”); see also Levi, supra note 63, 
at 1180 (apologies can be important to client satisfaction). 
 129. See Facing the Truth, supra note 33; Scheff, supra note 51, at 103 (the core sequence is 
“the key to reconciliation, victim satisfaction, and decreasing recidivism”). 
 130. Daicoff/Pepperdine, supra note 20 at 1–4. 
 131. Id. at 38–44.  See generally SUSAN DAICOFF, LAWYER, KNOW THYSELF (2004) (docu-
menting dissatisfaction with the legal system). 
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will hurt me as well”);132 (2) the emerging view that many legal disputes are 
really interpersonal failures;133 and (3) exploration of the relativity of truth, 
that truths are different for different people and there may not always be one 
story or one reality in a dispute.134  All of these ideas have influenced the 
way that law is being practiced as well as how legal disputes are being adju-
dicated and otherwise resolved.  For example, restorative justice processes 
(such as victim-offender mediation, family group conferencing, and circle 
sentencing and process),135 nonadversarial processes (such as collaborative 
law),136 and therapeutic processes (such as problem solving or community-
based courts)137 have developed and continue to flourish alongside more tra-
ditional means of litigating civil and criminal matters. 
Apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation are arguably relevant to all 
nine of the disciplines making up the comprehensive law movement.  In 
rough order of relevance here, these are: restorative justice, therapeutic ju-
risprudence, preventive law, procedural justice, transformative mediation, 
holistic justice, creative problem solving, problem solving courts, and col-
laborative law.138 
 
 132. For example, the website of Eco-Justice Ministries provides, as one of its four theological 
assumptions, “We live in a world of complex and interdependent relationships.  Our interpersonal 
relationships are important, and so are our ecological and institutional relationships.  The quality of 
all of those relationships has both practical and moral significance.”  ECO-JUSTICE MINISTRIES, Four 
Theological Affirmations, http://www.eco-justice.org/4affirmations.asp. 
 133. See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 6:7 (New Int’l 1984) (“The very fact that you have lawsuits among 
you means you have been completely defeated already,” meaning not defeat in a legal court, but that 
some failure on the part of the Christian to follow Christ has occurred).  An example of litigation 
ensuing after a failure to communicate or manage relationships well is Nanakuli Paving and Rock 
Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981) (many years’ contractual relationship broke down 
after a change in management and an unfortunate communication thereafter). 
 134. Gustave Courbet said that “[b]eauty, like truth, is relative to the time when one lives and to 
the individual who can grasp it.”  Gustave Courbet, BRAINY QUOTE, 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/g/gustavecou211373.html.  See Cindy Fazzi, Book Re-
view, In Mediation as In Life, Truth Is Relative, reviewing “Resolving Personal and Organizational 
Conflict: Stories of Transformation and Forgiveness,” by Kenneth Cloke and Joan Goldsmith, San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. (2000), Cris M. Currie, Mediating off the Grid, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 86 
(2001) (disputing parties tell different stories about the same facts). 
 135. See generally Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention, Conferences, Circles Boards, and Mediations: Restorative Justice and Citizen 
Involvement in Response to Youth Crime (1998); JOHNSTONE & VAN NESS, supra note 120, at 27–
29; ZEHR, supra note 48. 
 136. See generally TESLER, supra note 18; PAULINE H. TESLER & PEGGY THOMPSON, 
COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE (2006). 
 137. See the innovative court developments described at the website for the Center for Court 
Innovation, CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, www.courtinnovation.org (last visited Jan. 13, 2013). 
 138. Daicoff/Pepperdine, supra note 20, at 1–2. 
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A.  Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) is an approach to law, lawyering, and the 
resolution of legal matters that seeks to assess the effects of laws and legal 
rules, processes, and personnel on individuals’ wellbeing, relationships, and 
psychological functioning.  It asks whether the law’s effects are therapeutic 
or countertherapeutic and then, without trumping legal rights, seeks to em-
ploy legal rules, processes, and personnel in ways that are the most therapeu-
tic, sanative, ameliorative, or healing or the least countertherapeutic or dam-
aging.139 
TJ uses social science, as Maldonado and Maxwell do,140 to understand 
and assess the psychological impact of the law on individuals.141  It then 
proposes reforms to the law, legal processes, and legal rules in order that the 
law’s impact might be more beneficial, ameliorative or sanative—or at least 
not destructive.142  TJ would encompass the use of the sequence of apology, 
forgiveness, and reconciliation to examine when these concepts mightbenefit 
the wellbeing or future functioning of the parties involved in the dispute.  If 
so, TJ might recommend that resolution of the dispute include opportunities 
for apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation. 
For example, imagine a civil case in which a teenage driver, carrying 
three of his best friends and teammates on the high school basketball team, 
had a serious accident while coming home one night from a game.  The 
driver and front seat passenger were both seriously injured and had lengthy 
hospital stays.  By the time they were released from the hospital and re-
turned home, the passenger’s insurance company had begun litigation 
against the driver’s insurance company, and their respective attorneys had 
advised the teenagers not to communicate with each other while the lawsuit 
was pending.  Not only had the teenagers lost a great deal through the physi-
cal injuries and trauma, but this legal move also resulted in the loss of the 
support of a best friend.  In this situation, an apology from the driver to his 
 
 139. KEY, supra note 92, at xvii (quoting Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: 
Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 193 (1995) (reprinted in KEY, supra note 
92, at 763)); Daicoff/Pepperdine, supra note 20, at 11. 
 140. Maldonado, supra note 98; Maxwell, supra note 99. 
 141. PTJ, supra note 19, at 7 (suggesting that the “positive and negative consequences” of law 
“be studied with the tools” of social science). 
 142. Id. at 7 (stating that, “consistent with considerations of justice and other relevant norma-
tive values, law [should] be reformed to minimize anti-therapeutic consequences and to facilitate 
achievement of therapeutic ones”). 
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friend and the friend’s family might be, at some point, an important element 
of possible repair of their relationship or at the least, resolution of the con-
flict and closure for the families involved.  An apology from the teenage 
driver to the friend could be an important part of his own accountability-
taking, personal growth, and healing resulting from the resolution of this 
case.143  A TJ lawyer might build into the resolution of the legal matter an 
opportunity for apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation to occur between 
the two friends. 
In another example, from family law, Maldonado argues for a “TJ 
move” based on forgiveness.144  She says the law could require children’s 
involvement in divorce to give them more opportunity for voice, but could 
also provide opportunities for children to forgive their parents for divorcing, 
to improve their post-divorce functioning.145 
In criminal law, legal processes can acknowledge the benefits of en-
couraging an offender to apologize and a victim to forgive, in a facilitated 
encounter between them.146  This is precisely the process used in restorative 
justice, particularly in victim-offender mediation programs,147 which will be 
explored below.  Lower recidivism rates, for example, have been reported as 
a result of restorative justice processes.148 
Apology and forgiveness in both criminal and civil law may reduce un-
healthy shame and anger in both wrongdoers and those harmed, increase 
therapeutic guilt or reintegrative shame for wrongdoers,149 and assist the par-
ties  moving through the grief process instead of staying maladaptively and 
developmentally “stuck” in anger or denial.150  These effects, in turn, are 
likely to reduce recidivism in the wrongdoer, reintegrate the wrongdoer into 
the community, and promote healing and closure for those harmed by his 
 
 143. For example, see the facts of Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962), as 
set forth in RUSSELL G. PEARCE, DANIEL J. CAPRA, & BRUCE A. GREEN, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 775–85 (2011), quoting Timothy W. Floyd & John 
Gallagher, Legal Ethics, Narrative, and Professional Identity:  The Story of David Spaulding, 59 
MERCER L. REV. 941, 944–50 (2008) (detailing the dynamics of a lawsuit between the two families 
involved in a severe auto accident, with some deaths, in a small rural community). 
 144. Maldonado, supra note 98. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See generally Scheff, supra note 51; supra text accompanying notes 78–127. 
 147. See generally TESLER, supra note 18; TESLER & THOMPSON, supra note 137. 
 148. Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the Psychological 
Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 199 (2003) (in evaluation studies compar-
ing restorative justice programs to court programs, restorative justice outperformed courts in recidi-
vism and satisfaction measures). 
 149. See Scheff, supra note 51. 
 150. See Slocum, supra note 95, at 529–32. 
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acts.151  In 2000, Daniel Shuman listed a number of therapeutic benefits to 
apology; after noting the above effects, he added a few more.152  First, apol-
ogy is believed to be “a vehicle to adjust an imbalance of power in a rela-
tionship that occurs when a wrong is committed by a party to the relation-
ship.”153  Second, it places responsibility for harm on the apologizer and re-
removes doubt about contributory accountability from the victim (e.g., “if I 
had not done such and such, maybe the harm would not have happened”).154  
Third, it can be an “important therapeutic balm,”155 and it can make parties 
more willing to settle.156  However, he also explored empirical evidence that 
apologies do not have a uniformly positive effect and cautioned against 
over-optimism in their use, while concluding that apologies are generally 
useful in tort cases.157 
Due to the benefits and healing promoted by apology and forgiveness 
described above,158 they are just as utile in civil dispute resolution as they 
are in criminal law.  Because it tends to facilitate a deeper peace or resolu-
tion of the legal matter, all civil and criminal dispute resolution processes 
may consider incorporating opportunities for apology, forgiveness, and rec-
onciliation where appropriate.159  This includes traditional pre-trial (or even 
pre-filing) negotiation and settlement, mediation, arbitration, and litigation. 
Law professor and TJ co-founder David Wexler has mined social sci-
ence research for ways to enhance parties’ compliance with post-litigation 
court orders, such as when a court orders a criminal defendant to take certain 
preventive actions (e.g., cleanup) in an environmental case.160  He argues 
 
 151. See Scheff, supra note 51. 
 152. See Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180, 183 (2000) 
(exploring in detail the field of apology and concluding that, despite scant empirical evidence for its 
benefits, apology has therapeutic potential in in tort law). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. at 184. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 183. 
 157. Id. at 189. 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 82–130. 
 159. For example, many cases may involve parties who will not be able to meet or interact in a 
positive manner, despite extensive pre-meeting preparation (such as perhaps some domestic violence 
cases), or for whom it is meaningless (such as large corporate clients with no relational history or 
future between them, or tax or regulatory matters between a corporate client and a governmental 
agency). 
 160. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, in KEY, supra note 
92, at 157–167.  See also Bruce J. Winick, Redefining the Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer at 
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that this research suggests that making a public commitment to comply with 
a behavior plan—here a court order—can enhance the likelihood that the 
wrongdoer will comply with the court order.161  A public apology and state-
ment of intention to change may similarly enhance the possibility that the 
apologizer will carry through and change his behavior in the future. 
In sum, integrating apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation into the law 
can make the law work more sanatively.  However, lawyers and judges 
might not accept this as a legitimate goal of the law and may wonder how to 
integrate this into traditional approaches to lawyering and judging.  TJ pro-
vides a theoretical framework to justify integrating apology, forgiveness, and 
reconciliation into all dispute resolution processes (criminal and civil).  TJ 
also explains why adjunctive processes in the law or diversionary programs 
in lieu of traditional adjudication should be proposed to accomplish these 
goals, and encourages legitimizing and coordinating similar efforts across all 
substantive areas of the law. 
B.   Preventive Law 
Preventive law, founded by the late Louis Brown, is the concept that law 
can be used preventatively to avoid litigation.162  It is similar to preventive 
medicine, which seeks to prevent disease and illness.  Lawyers can meet 
with their clients to conduct legal checkups and audits of the clients’ affairs, 
uncover situations that might lead to litigation in the future, and put legal 
strategies in place or make moves to avoid such litigation.163  In addition, lit-
igated cases can be “rewound” to explore how the litigation might have been 
prevented by proactive, early-intervention legal moves.164 
For example, as discussed earlier, apologies by physicians and hospitals 
in medical malpractice situations have demonstrably reduced both the 
amount of medical malpractice litigation brought against those physicians 
and hospitals by the harmed patients and their families and the dollar amount 
 
Plea Bargaining and Sentencing: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventive Law Model, in PTJ, supra 
note 19, at 279–80. 
 161. Wexler, supra note 161. 
 162. ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, PREVENTIVE LAW: MATERIALS ON A NON ADVERSARIAL LEGAL 
PROCESS (1997) (the “textbook” for preventive law).  The PREVENTIVE LAW REPORTER has been 
published since 1982 (Butterworth Legal Publishers) by the National Center for Preventive Law 
(U.S.), University of Denver, College of Law.  See also LOUIS M. BROWN & EDWARD A. DAUER, 
PLANNING BY LAWYERS: MATERIALS ON A NON-ADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS (1977). 
 163. PTJ, supra note 19, at 6–7 (describing these aspects of preventive law). 
 164. See PTJ, supra note 19, at 75–77 (illustrating a rewind of a case).  See generally Bruce J. 
Winick, A Legal Autopsy of the Lawyering in Schiavo: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventive Law 
Rewind Exercise, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 595 (2007). 
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paid out to settle those claims.165  Apologies can be an excellent litigation 
prevention move by potential defendants.  First, obtaining an apology may 
be one of the potential plaintiff’s main purposes in suing.166  Second, by re-
ducing anger and hostility between the parties, apology (and forgiveness, if 
given) can minimize the potential for emotion-driven litigation, as Slocum 
suggests.167  Apology is therefore entirely consistent with a preventive law 
approach to litigation, where that litigation arises from wrongdoing for 
which the actor can apologize. 
C. Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice (PJ) refers to robust social science findings that liti-
gants’ satisfaction and perceptions of fairness of legal processes depend not 
on whether they won or lost, but on three factors: (1) having a voice and par-
ticipation in the decision making process; (2) being treated with respect and 
dignity by those in authority; and (3) perceiving those in authority as  trust-
worthy, which in turn depends on having decisions explained by those in au-
thority.168  These conclusions are based on empirical social science findings 
by Lind and Tyler in the 1990s.169 
The most important of these findings for apology is perhaps the idea that 
legal participants—litigants and crime victims for example—desire a 
“voice,” that is, a chance to tell their story and be heard.  This might be rele-
 
 165. See examples cited supra text accompanying notes 8–11. 
 166. For example, near the end of the film, A CIVIL ACTION, the lawyers meet with the plain-
tiffs to deliver the monetary outcome of the lawsuit.  One plaintiff expresses dissatisfaction, remind-
ing her attorney that she never wanted money for the wrongful death of her son; what she wanted 
was an apology for what had been done.  The apology was not made and the plaintiff was dissatis-
fied with receiving money in lieu of it.  A Civil Action, supra  note 124.  See also Robbenolt, supra 
note 124, at 358–59; Tamara Relis, “It’s not about the money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of 
Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 341, 361 (2006) (noting that most claimants’ motives 
for suing are not financial); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Role of Apologies in Resolving Health Care 
Disputes, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1018 (2005) (noting the desire of plaintiffs in medical mal-
practice cases for apologies, full disclosure, explanations, and plans for how similar events would 
not happen in the future). 
 167. See PATRICK J. FLINN, HANDBOOK OF INTELL. PROP. CLAIMS & REMEDIES § 1.02 (Supp. 
2011) (suggesting that clients in commercial disputes should not litigate because of “frustration or 
anger” but should examine more rational purposes, such as “commercial business realities”).  See 
also Slocum, supra note 91 (exploring generally the negative aspects of vengefulness in clients 
which apology may reduce). 
 168. Tom Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedure, in KEY, supra note 
92. 
 169. Id. 
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vant when crafting a process of apology; for example, forgiveness might de-
pend on whether or not the hearer felt as if he had been given a chance to be 
heard by the apologizer first. 
For example, in victim-offender mediations, often the victim speaks 
first.170  The victim is encouraged to express to the offender the impact of the 
offense on the victim’s life, describe the extent and nature of the harm done, 
and ask questions, if desired, about why the offensive action was done.171  
This process can provide a “voice” for the victim that a traditional criminal 
court might not.  When the offender speaks, the offender is encouraged to 
acknowledge this impact and harm, thus affirming that the victim’s voice 
was heard by the offender.172 
Giving civil parties opportunities for apology, forgiveness, and reconcil-
iation can, if engineered properly, provide an opportunity for both sides to 
have “voice” and participation in the dispute resolution process.  For exam-
ple, in a contract dispute between former business partners, both parties may 
have done and said things they regret.  Having an opportunity for mutual 
apologies and mutual forgiveness in a mediation or settlement conference 
setting might afford both parties more voice, ownership of the resolution 
process, and a greater stake in resolving the dispute.  They might become 
more active and collaborative with each other in crafting a plan of action for 
ending their partnership satisfactorily.  This, in turn, should enhance their 
satisfaction with the process.173  Finally, studies suggest that parties’ en-
hanced satisfaction with a legal process may lead to greater compliance with 
any court order or settlement agreement resulting from the process.174 
D.   Holistic Justice and Creative Problem Solving 
These two vectors do not explicitly relate to apology, forgiveness, and 
reconciliation, but both generally encourage healing in parties involved in 
legal matters or seek to consider more than the assertion of legal rights in 
legal matters.175  Holistic justice seeks to view legal matters from a broader 
perspective and to foster peace among involved parties.176  It explicitly in-
 
 170. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 136. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Voice and participation are important to litigants’ satisfaction with legal processes, accord-
ing to empirical research by Tyler, see Tyler, supra note 169. 
 174. See Wexler, supra note 161. 
 175. Daicoff/Pepperdine, supra note 20, at 5–10. 
 176. From the former website of the former (now dissolved) International Alliance of Holistic 
Lawyers (www.iahl.org).  This organization, founded primarily by and for practicing lawyers, dis-
banded in 2011 as it had served its transformative purpose within the legal profession.  See also 
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corporates the lawyer’s and client’s moral and spiritual beliefs and values in 
the legal representation.177  Creative problem solving views legal matters as 
problems to be solved and considers parties’ needs, goals, resources, 
strengths, psychological functioning, and the like, in addition to their legal 
rights and duties, in seeking creative solutions to those problems.178  The 
therapeutic benefits of apology and forgiveness for parties are valuable con-
siderations for both holistic lawyers and those operating as creative problem 
solvers, because both approaches look outside the legal rights, obligations, 
and duties involved in legal matters to seek a more comprehensively satis-
factory outcome.179  They both take into account factors such as the client’s 
beliefs, goals, values, needs, resources, relationships, wellbeing, and mental 
state in crafting a solution to the legal problem with the client.180 
In addition, fostering an opportunity for litigating parties to apologize 
and forgive one another may well be a holistic or creative solution to the le-
gal problem as an alternative to litigation or even traditional mediation.  Fi-
nally, the potential for reconciliation of the parties to each other (horizontal 
harmony) and for reconciliation of a wrongdoer to the Divine (vertical har-
mony) is likely to be particularly consonant with a holistic approach to legal 
matters, which explicitly allows for the integration of value- or faith-based 
concerns of lawyers and clients into legal representation.181  Forgiving one’s 
 
WRIGHT, supra note 16 (authored by an American lawyer, mediator, collaborative lawyer, author, 
and journalist, this book explores in detail the comprehensive law movement, including practicing 
law holistically). 
 177. Correspondence with William Van Zyverden, founder, International Alliance of Holistic 
Lawyers (Nov. 1999) (on file with author). 
 178. Linda Morton, Teaching Creative Problem Solving: A Paradigmatic Approach, 34 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 375, 376–78 (1998) (exploring the application of creative problem solving to traditional 
legal situations); THOMAS D. BARTON, PREVENTIVE LAW AND PROBLEM SOLVING: LAWYERING FOR 
THE FUTURE (2009) (the most recent and exhaustive book on preventive law, authored by the direc-
tor of the National Center for Preventive Law at California Western School of Law).  See generally 
Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. The Case Method: A Marvelous Adventure in Which 
Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 351 (1998) (exploring the application of 
creative problem solving to the famous Palsgraf case in many first-year torts classes). 
 179. See SUSAN DAICOFF, COMPREHENSIVE LAW PRACTICE: LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 
125–131, 135 (2011) [hereinafter DAICOFF/CLP] (noting this feature of both holistic law and crea-
tive problem solving). 
 180. See Daicoff/Pepperdine, supra note 20, at 20–24 (exploring some extralegal concerns rele-
vant in creative problem solving and holistic justice). 
 181. Van Zyverden, supra note 178.  Horizontal and vertical harmony are discussed at supra 
text accompanying notes 53–54. 
29
Daicoff: Apology, Forgiveness, Reconciliation & Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 160 
enemies and making amends for harms done are concepts consistent with 
Christianity, for example, as well as other religions.182 
E. Transformative Mediation 
In civil law, some forms of mediation, such as transformative media-
tion,183 tend to encourage and foster a process similar to Scheff’s “core se-
quence.”184  They encourage the parties to see the situation from the other’s 
perspective, to understand why they feel and act as they do, and to com-
municate this mutual understanding to each other.185  They argue that with-
out this exchange of “recognition” or empathy to the other, deep resolution 
or deep peace between parties will not occur. 
Transformative mediation (TM) is an approach to mediation of civil and 
criminal disputes that explicitly focuses on improving the moral growth of 
the two parties.186  It was conceived of by law professor R. Baruch Bush in 
the 1990s and has been used in a wide variety of settings, including the 
United States Postal Office, to resolve workplace disputes.187  In TM, the 
mediator focuses on fostering “moral growth” in the disputing parties by 
centering on two things: “empowerment” and “recognition.”188  Empower-
ment refers to helping the parties realize that they have options and choices 
and that they are not a victim of fate but have some measure of decision 
making ability, personal power, and control in the dispute resolution pro-
cess.189  Recognition, however, is arguably the most relevant to apology.  It 
resembles what psychologists call “empathy”: the ability of one party to 
“stand in the shoes” of the other party and to understand the thoughts, feel-
 
 182. See Matthew 6:9–13 (New International Version 2004) (mentioning forgiveness); Pyn-
chon, supra note 86, at 323 (concluding with thoughts about the relevance of amends, faith, for-
giveness in Alcoholics Anonymous in the restorative justice context); Shuman, supra note 153, at 
183 (noting that the Talmud references “repentance”). 
 183. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE 
TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT (2005) [hereinafter BUSH & FOLGER (1997)]. 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 62–123, regarding Scheff’s core sequence. 
 185. This is known as “recognition,” one of two explicit goals of TM.  BUSH & FOLGER (1997), 
supra note 184, at 23. 
 186. See generally BUSH & FOLGER (1997), supra note 184. 
 187. Id. at 26.  The USPS transformative mediation program is known as REDRESS, which 
stands for Resolve Employment Disputes Reach Equitable Solutions Swiftly.  Id.; see also UNITED 
STATES POSTAL SERVICE, REDRESS, http://about.usps.com/what-we-are-
doing/redress/welcome.htm. 
 188. Id. at 22, 23. 
 189. Id. at 35. 
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ings, motivations, and actions of the other party.190  It also encompasses the 
expression by one party of that understanding to the other party, which TM 
calls “giving recognition.”191  Giving recognition, according to TM, fosters 
moral growth in the parties involved, which is TM’s explicit aim.192 
TM might call the shift that occurs in a successful apology-forgiveness 
sequence a “shift to the other,” meaning that each party shifts his focus from 
a self-centered, narcissistic focus on his own feelings, wants, and needs to a 
focus on understanding the other better.193  Further, TM would say that a 
party has experienced desirable moral growth when he makes this shift and 
that it is a mark of increased maturity.194 
For example, imagine a personal injury case where, through pre-trial 
settlement negotiations or mediation, the defendant comes to understand, for 
the first time, the impact of the injury on the plaintiff, her family, her self-
esteem, and her future hopes and dreams.  When he acknowledges this to the 
plaintiff, it may fulfill TM’s concept of “giving recognition.”195  In turn, this 
“giving of recognition” by the defendant to the plaintiff might be received 
by the plaintiff as an apology.  For example, if the defendant says, “I under-
stand now how this affected you, and I realize it has been devastating for 
you,” his next statement indeed might be an expression of remorse—e.g., 
“and I am sorry for your pain.”  The plaintiff might experience healing as a 
result of these statements and then might decide to forgive the defendant.  If 
her statement of forgiveness includes her understanding of his plight as 
well—e.g., “Thank you.  I see that it hasn’t been easy for you either, and I 
now understand more about why you did what you did”— it may fulfill 
TM’s concept of giving recognition.  Therefore, the concepts of apology and 
forgiveness easily may relate to TM’s concept of recognition. 
While recognition—the experience of one party’s expressing an under-
standing of the other party’s thoughts, feelings, motives, or actions—
certainly can facilitate remorse, it may not be a necessary prerequisite for it.  
One might be remorseful for one’s actions without appreciating the experi-
 
 190. Id. at 37.  See Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Competence and the Lawyer’s Journey, in 
SILVER, supra note 19, at 5–52 (describing empathy from a social science perspective and describing 
its utility in lawyering). 
 191. BUSH & FOLGER (1997), supra note 184, at 77. 
 192. Id. at 22–23. 
 193. Id. at 55. 
 194. Id. at 12, 95. 
 195. BUSH & FOLGER (1994), supra note 75, at 90–91. 
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ence of the other or the harm the other has suffered.196  While apology, for-
giveness, and reconciliation of the parties are not the aim of TM, they may 
well be by-products of a transformative mediation process. 
F.  Collaborative Law 
Collaborative law is an innovative form of domestic relations law prac-
tice in which lawyers representing divorcing spouses eschew court in favor 
of resolving the legal issues of divorce and child custody and support via a 
series of four-way (or more) conferences between the two attorneys and two 
spouses.197  Neutral or partisan interdisciplinary experts may also be includ-
ed as part of the “team.”198  The lawyers contractually agree to withdraw 
from legal representation of the clients if the talks break down, settlement is 
not reached, and the parties proceed to court.199  This aligns the lawyers’ fi-
nancial interests with that of the clients and facilitates movement towards a 
non-litigated resolution of the case.200  In addition, discovery is voluntary 
and the process is “collaborative” rather than needlessly adversarial.201  Col-
laborative law and collaborative divorce are designed to promote positive 
interactions between divorcing spouses in order to maximize their post-
 
 196. Perhaps one develops remorse only because one is sorry one has been caught, charged 
with a crime, or sued for a wrong, thus maintaining a narcissistic focus on oneself. 
 197. See generally TESLER, supra note 18 (book authored by a pioneer and trainer in the collab-
orative law field, speaking primarily to lawyers who wish to become collaborative lawyers).  See 
also FORREST S. MOSTEN, COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE HANDBOOK:  HELPING FAMILIES WITHOUT 
GOING TO COURT (2009); TESLER & THOMPSON, supra note 134; STUART G. WEBB & RONALD D. 
OUSKY, HOW THE COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE METHOD OFFERS LESS STRESS, LOWER COST, AND 
HAPPIER KIDS WITHOUT GOING TO COURT: THE SMART DIVORCE (2006); NANCY J. CAMERON, 
COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE: DEEPENING THE DIALOGUE (2004); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative 
Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 967 (1999); Pauline H. 
Tesler, Collaborative Law: What It Is and Why Family Law Attorneys Need to Know About It, 13 
AM. J. FAM. L. 215 (1999); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Approach to Family Law 
ADR, 2 CONFLICT MGMT. 12 (1996); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law Neutrals Produce Better 
Resolutions, 21 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG. 1 (2003); Pauline H. Tesler, Client Relations: 
Tips From a Collaborative Practitioner, 21 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG. 13 (2003).  National 
and local collaborative law websites exist in many areas.  See, e.g., INT’L ACAD. OF 
COLLABORATIVE PROFS., http://www.collaborativepractice.com/. 
 198. Gary L. Voegele, et al., Family Law: Collaborative Law: A Useful Tool for the Family 
Law Practitioner to Promote Better Outcomes, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 971, 976 n.25 (2007) 
(describing the interdisciplinary form of collaborative divorce).  See also TESLER & THOMPSON, su-
pra note 134 (book devoted to collaborative divorce). 
 199. TESLER, supra note 18, at 6.  See also Voegele, et al., supra note 196, at 978 (noting the 
various names given to this feature). 
 200. TESLER, supra note 18, at 11. 
 201. Jennifer M. Kuhn, Working Around the Withdrawal Agreement: Statutory Evidentiary 
Safeguards Negate the Need for a Withdrawal Agreement in Collaborative Law Proceedings, 30 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 363, 371 (2008). 
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divorce well-being and ability to work together to co-parent any children of 
their marriage.202 
Apology and forgiveness between divorcing spouses are not explicitly 
part of a collaborative law process, but certainly could facilitate resolution of 
collaborative law cases.  Given the collaborative atmosphere of this form of 
law, apology and forgiveness could easily occur and be fostered.  For exam-
ple, collaborative lawyer and trainer Pauline Tesler mentions that collabora-
tive clients must be able to manage their negative emotions, avoid slipping 
into their “shadow self,” and negotiate honestly.203  Striving towards this 
ideal may encourage clients to consider apologizing to and forgiving each 
other.  If this occurs, it may also facilitate a smoother resolution of the col-
laborative law case. 
For example, imagine a collaborative case in which the wife finds the 
husband in an extramarital relationship that has now ended.  The resolution 
of their dissolution in a collaborative process may proceed more smoothly if 
an apology is given and received.  It may even prompt a mutual apology 
where both parties acknowledge their part in the end of their marriage, 
which is likely to have a significant impact on any lingering feelings of bit-
terness, blame, or uncertainty.  It may also assist the parties in resolving the 
divorce emotionally, releasing anger and blame as Slocum suggests,204 and 
moving on. 
Reconciliation, on the other hand, is an unknown quantity in the context 
of collaborative law.  It could refer to the spouses becoming less hostile to-
wards each other, or it could mean they stay married.  The International 
Academy of Collaborative Professionals reports data showing that, of 710 
collaborative cases in the United States between 2006 and 2009, 3 percent of 
the couples reconciled.205 
 
 202. Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & LAW 967, 967–79 (1999). 
 203. Id. at 967. 
 204. Slocum, supra note 91, at 529–32 (counseling clients and lawyers to work towards releas-
ing anger in litigation). 
 205. Data provided by Attorney Nicole Habl of Jacksonville, Florida, in a collaborative law 
training in Jacksonville (2009) (according to Habl, the International Academy of Collaborative Pro-
fessionals reported that of these 710 cases, 87 percent completed the CL process, 10 percent termi-
nated the collaborative process, and 3 percent of the couples reconciled). 
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G. Restorative Justice 
Restorative justice (RJ) is a broad movement within criminal law to use 
an alternative process to handle criminal cases.  It seeks to involve all the 
stakeholders in a crime—offenders, victims, and the surrounding communi-
ty—in its disposition.206  It defines crime as an offense by the offender 
against others, not against the state, and it seeks restorative measures rather 
than retributive justice.207  RJ has empirically documented lower recidivism 
rates among criminal defendants engaged in RJ as compared to traditional 
criminal justice processes.208 
RJ is the most relevant of the vectors, as it explicitly incorporates apolo-
gy, forgiveness, and reconciliation of victims, offenders, and society into its 
resolution of criminal matters.209  For example, it contemplates that the of-
fender will accept responsibility for his acts and then express that (if not ful-
ly apologize) directly to the victim, to other affected individuals, and to so-
ciety.  It contemplates that these individuals might then, in an ideal situation, 
express forgiveness to the offender, and that the victim and offender would 
be reconciled.  It also hopes that the offender will be reconciled with and re-
integrated back into his community.  It provides for offenders to make sym-
bolic reparations (i.e., apologies) and material reparations (e.g., fines, pay-
ments, community service, and other perhaps creative measures such as 
having a driving-while-intoxicated offender give lectures to local teen 
groups on the dangers of drunk driving) to the victims and the community.210  
It gives victims and the community a voice and participation in determining 
the outcome of the crime and the consequences to the offender.  It can be 
used as (1) a pretrial diversion or alternative to the traditional criminal 
courts, such as in family group conferencing for juvenile crime, (2) an alter-
native sentencing measure, such as in circle sentencing in a tight-knit com-
munity, or (3) a post-adjudication, stand-alone measure with no legal effect, 
such as in victim–offender mediation in the United States.211 
Restorative justice explicitly rests on the assumption that apology-
forgiveness-reconciliation is desirable, and it provides opportunities for 
criminal offenders and victims to meet, face-to-face, for that express pur-
 
 206. See ZEHR, supra note 48, at 64–69. 
 207. Id. at 58–59. 
 208. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 136, at 28, 34; see also MOSTEN, supra note 198, at 397. 
 209. See generally Scheff, supra note 51 (explicitly examining apology, forgiveness, and rec-
onciliation in the context of a “core sequence” in restorative justice processes). 
 210. Scheff, supra note 51, at 102–04. 
 211. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 133, at 3–4 (describing four types of RJ processes: vic-
tim-offender mediation, family group conferences, circle sentencing, and reparative probation pro-
grams). 
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pose.212  If face-to-face meetings are not possible, some RJ processes can be 
accomplished by letter, video, or other means of communication. 
For example, Barbara Stahura gives an example of a father of three who 
was killed by a drunk driver one summer night as he and his wife were walk-
ing home from a community festival.213  The driver was a twenty-five-year-
old deputy county sheriff.  The wife, also injured in the accident, found her-
self sympathetic to the driver and requested a lighter sentence, which the 
county attorney refused.  Dissatisfied with the legal process, she and the 
driver began meeting separately with a restorative justice mediator.  After a 
year of preparatory meetings, they were ready to meet.  In the meeting, they 
reached an agreement by which the driver would speak to the father’s three 
children about their father’s death, and the wife and the driver would speak 
jointly to school and community groups and would ask the city council to 
build a sidewalk on the road where the accident happened.214 
Stahura does not report the following, but here is an ideal sequence:215 
This is the sort of victim–offender mediation in which the wife would speak 
first, describing the impact on her of the accident and her husband’s death.  
She might also have questions for the driver (e.g., “What happened that 
night?”).  The driver would speak next, acknowledging the harm his actions 
had caused, answering her questions, and apologizing to the wife.  With 
more discussion, the wife might eventually extend forgiveness to the offend-
er (although this is not mandatory).  Together they would begin outlining a 
plan of reparations he could make to repair the harm and be reintegrated into 
their small, mutual community. In some situations, the reconciliation be-
tween the victims and offenders is so profound that they are able then to 
speak jointly to civic groups and others (as these two did216) about the dan-
gers of drunk driving. 
However, reaping the full benefits of the apology-forgiveness-
reconciliation sequence in criminal law would require providing more op-
portunities for restorative justice processes to be used in criminal cases.  
 
 212. Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L. J. 731, 740  (2010) (stating that RJ includes 
“moral and substantive principles, including responsibility, remorse, atonement, making amends, 
moral learning, forgiveness, and reconciliation”). 
 213. Barbara Stahura, Trail ‘Em, Nail ‘Em, and Jail ‘Em: Restorative Justice, Spirituality & 
Health, Spring 2001, at 43. 
 214. Id. 
 215. For an explanation and overview of this process, see ZEHR, supra note 48 and MOSTEN, 
supra note 194. 
 216. Stahura, supra note 214, at 43. 
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Americans are usually loathe to replace traditional criminal courts with re-
storative justice processes, most likely due to a deep societal commitment to 
individual freedoms and rights embodied in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.217  As such, in the United 
States, RJ has historically been limited to use in juvenile offenses in lieu of 
adjudication (such as “teen court”) and in stand-alone, adjunctive processes 
in adult criminal litigation (such as post-incarceration, victim–offender me-
diation that has no effect on the legal outcome of the case).  While restora-
tive justice processes such as victim–offender mediation or community cir-
cles can be used pre-adjudication (in lieu of traditional court adjudication) 
and post-adjudication (as a diversionary process in lieu of traditional sen-
tencing), RJ may remain relegated to the post-sentencing phase as an adjunc-
tive, non-legal process.218  Even so, RJ could be expanded in the United 
States as follows: each community or courthouse could establish specialized 
RJ centers to provide space, personnel (including mediators trained in RJ), 
and other resources (such as perhaps social workers, other interdisciplinary 
professionals, and training for public and private lawyers to be able to con-
duct RJ sessions in criminal cases).  These RJ-trained lawyers could serve as 
independent third-party RJ mediators rather than as representational advo-
cates in the cases.  Alternatively, perhaps both prosecutors and criminal de-
fense lawyers might be trained in RJ, so they could facilitate informal RJ 
processes between victims and offenders in all criminal cases.  The use of RJ 
is likely to promote healing and lowered crime incidences for victims, crim-
inal offenders, and communities. 
H.   Problem Solving Courts 
Apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation may also be relevant in prob-
lem solving courts, which encompass drug treatment courts, domestic vio-
lence courts, homeless courts, mental health courts, and community 
courts.219  In drug treatment court, criminal offenders who are substance-
dependent and otherwise eligible may volunteer for the program, which 
places them into court-mandated and court-supervised substance abuse 
treatment in lieu of traditional criminal court.  Upon successful graduation 
and rehabilitation, the criminal charges are often dropped or avoided. 
 
 217. U. S. Const. amend. IV, V, VI (protecting against unreasonable search and seizure, pro-
tecting against double-jeopardy and self-incrimination, and protecting the right to a speedy trial). 
 218. DAICOFF/CLP, supra note 180, at 229. 
 219. CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, http://www.courtinnovation.org (last visited September 
4, 2011) (listing these courts and others in separate webpages therein). 
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Many substance abuse programs rely on “twelve-step” programs such as 
Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous as part of the rehabilita-
tion.  These twelve step programs explicitly contain a mandate for members 
to “make amends” with those they have harmed in the past220 and also to 
make amends on a routine basis.221  This amends process contemplates a 
combination of apologizing to those persons harmed by the member and 
changing one’s behavior towards them in the future.222  Therefore, indirectly, 
apologies may be practically mandatory for drug treatment court partici-
pants, via these court-ordered, twelve-step-based, treatment programs.223  
Forgiveness is, of course, entirely optional on the part of those to whom 
amends are made, but it, as well as reconciliation with family and friends, 
may occur through the rehabilitative process. 
I.  An Expanded “Toolkit” for the Lawyer 
David Wexler has suggested that the comprehensive law movement vec-
tors fall into two groups: those that form theoretical approaches to legal mat-
ters and those that provide concrete processes for their resolution.224  More 
specifically, he explains that TJ, PL, HJ, CPS, and PJ might be seen as 
lenses through which one might view a legal dispute and assess what moves 
in the case would accomplish the respective goals of each lens (e.g., be ther-
apeutic to, countertherapeutic to, provide voice for, or silence the parties).225  
While CL, TM, RJ, and problem solving courts can function as lenses, they 
also provide concrete processes and methods (with specific skills) to resolve 
disputes that differ from traditional means of resolution.226  There is a great 
deal of overlap or combination of vectors.  For example, problem solving 
 
 220. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions, World Services, Inc. 83–
87 (1952; 2000).  “Step Nine” requires members to make direct “amends.”  Id. at 83. 
 221. “Step Ten” requires members to “continue . . . to take personal inventory and when we 
were wrong promptly admit . . . it.”  Id. at 88. 
 222. Amends within “Step Nine” mean to “freely admit the damage we have done and make 
our apologies . . . pay, or promise to pay, whatever obligations, financial or otherwise, we owe.”  Id. 
at 84. 
 223. See Pynchon, supra note 86, at 318 (exploring the relationship of twelve-step programs to 
restorative justice and apology-forgiveness-reconciliation). 
 224. Daicoff/Pepperdine, supra note 20, at 10 citing David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Pa-
tients, Professionals, and the Path of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. 907, 
909–10, reprinted in KEY, supra note 92. 
 225. See Daicoff/Pepperdine, supra note 20, at 11–24. 
 226. See id. at 24–38. 
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court is a specific legal process that often references TJ as its theoretical ba-
sis (lens).227  Further, one can choose one or more lenses through which to 
approach a legal matter (e.g., divorce could be viewed through a combina-
tion of TJ, PL, and CPS lenses) and, using those lenses, one or more pro-
cesses could be used to resolve it (e.g., divorce could be resolved through 
CL or perhaps facilitative mediation).  It is likely that the approaches and 
combinations will vary as appropriate, on a case-by-case basis. 
When practicing law “comprehensively,” it may be useful to group the 
vectors into an “organizational chart” containing all the possible comprehen-
sive approaches and dispute resolution methods a lawyer or court could take 
when dealing with particular legal matters.228  This chart illustrates the varie-
ty of “lenses” and processes available to the modern lawyer, mediator, and 
judge.  Where the traditional adversarial model led only to traditional court 
or out-of-court settlement the comprehensive law movement substantially 
expands the “toolkit” of lawyers, dispute resolvers, and courts. 
Comprehensive lawyers therefore have at their disposal a wide array of 
perspectives and processes with which to handle legal matters.  They may 
combine the various vectors of the comprehensive law movement with each 
other and with traditional approaches and processes, on a case-by-case basis, 
as appropriate.  Because apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation may be 
relevant to most of the vectors of the comprehensive law movement, they 
may be employed in many comprehensive law cases. 
V.  MAKING APOLOGIES EFFECTIVE 
Once it has been determined that apology, forgiveness, and even recon-
ciliation might be valuable in resolving legal disputes, certain elements are 
required for maximum effectiveness.229 
 
 227. A joint resolution of the Conference of Chief Justices (Resolution 22) and the Conference 
of State Court Administrators (Resolution 4), adopted in August 2000, specifically encourages the 
development of courts utilizing therapeutic jurisprudence principles (such as drug treatment courts), 
referring to them as “problem solving courts and calendars.”  CCJ Res. 22, Cong. (2000); COSCA 
Res. 4, Cong. (2000), http://dcpi.ncjrs.org/pdf/Chief%20Justice%20Resolution.doc (last visited July 
8, 2010). 
 228. Susan Daicoff, Afterword: The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence within the Comprehen-
sive Law Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 486–89 (DENNIS P. STOLLE, 
DAVID B. WEXLER, & BRUCE J. WINICK eds., 2000). 
 229. Smith, supra note 34.  See also Shuman, supra note 153 (exploring a wide array of neces-
sary elements for apologies. 
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A.   A Practical Framework for Apologies 
In 2009, the author asked her upper-level elective Comprehensive Law 
Practice law school class to draft victim statements and offender apolo-
gies.230  Despite variations, there were recurring themes that were common 
to their written products.  These themes are consistent with the RJ literature 
and may give lawyers a road map for how to coach clients in drafting these 
statements.  They are set forth in the following table: 
 
Concept  Victim’s Need Offender’s Apology 
Consequences To express the impact the O’s 
actions had on the V’s life, in-
cluding expressing the painful 
emotions caused in the V by the 
event 
To understand and 
acknowledge the impact the 
O’s actions had on the V’s life 
Apology/Remorse To believe; to have faith that the 
O really is sorry for what he did, 
is remorseful, and regrets what 
happened not solely for selfish 
reasons 
To apologize; to say I’m sorry, 
express remorse; to regret that 
the event happened to the V, in 
a sincere, non-selfish, non-self-
focused manner, with O being 
visibly ashamed of what he did 
and not being angry, which 
allows V to see O as human—
forges a bond between V & O 
Responsibility To have all blame shifted entire-
ly off the V and entirely onto the 
O for the event 
To accept responsibility for 
what happened, to express 
awareness that the event was 
“wrong” and that O did wrong 
Forgiveness To forgive the O, to stop being 
angry with the O, to stop lectur-
ing the O from a moral hilltop, 
to see the O as a fellow human 
being—forges bond between the 
V & the O 
NOTE: relentless anger at the O 
To receive V’s forgiveness 
 
 230. This course, which is a survey skills course of the various vectors of the comprehensive 
law movement, has been taught by the author (since 2001) and others at Florida Coastal School of 
Law and at Arizona Summit Law School. 
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is moral indignation, which is 
unacknowledged (projected) 
shame  
Understanding To ask why, to understand more 
about why this happened to the 
V; may also include understand-
ing the O as a fellow human 
being 
Explains why the offense was 
done; may also include under-
standing the V as a fellow hu-
man being 
Positive Out-
come/Rehabilitation 
To have faith that something 
good can come out of this event, 
that the O will improve as a re-
sult 
To admit that O has a problem, 
to express O’s willingness to 
change 
Restitution to V To receive material restitution 
from the O, to “make whole” the 
loss that arose from the event 
To express willingness to make 
material restitution to V, to 
outline a plan for it 
Plan for the Future To know that this will not hap-
pen again 
To describe his plan for chang-
ing and not recidivating 
 
Two other concepts from the apology-forgiveness-reconciliation litera-
ture may be relevant but did not appear in the students’ work: restoration and 
reconciliation.231  All of the foregoing should result in the restoration of the 
offender to society as a respected member without shame, restoration of the 
victim’s status in society, restoration for the victim’s wound or loss, and res-
toration of the social order and the balance to the society in which victim 
and offender live.232  Reconciliation of the parties’ relations may or may not 
occur, as stated above.233  Finally, while this table is written in terms of a 
criminal case, it may also be applied in situations involving civil wrongs, 
where there is a wrongdoer and persons harmed.  A recent civil apology is 
analyzed, below, using this table. 
B.   Example: Tiger Woods’ Public Apology 
As mentioned above,234 professional golfer Tiger Woods, upon being 
discovered in marital unfaithfulness, made a public apology in 2010.235  The 
 
 231. See supra text accompanying notes 53–57. 
 232. See O. Carter Snead, Memory and Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1195 (2011) (referenc-
ing the reintegration of both offenders and victims into society, “often after a large-scale atrocity,” 
and exploring restoration). 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 53–57. 
 234. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 235. Woods, Tiger Wood’s apology, supra note 3. 
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Woods apology as set forth in Appendix 2 is quite complete, as it contains 
all of the elements listed above. 
However, some might argue that the Woods apology lacks something 
“intangible”—that it seems contrived or too well-controlled.  This might re-
late to the fact that he did not take questions in the public appearance and 
that it occurred several months after the events.236 
Perhaps, as Mr. Woods states, time will tell and the real apology will 
come from his behavior in the future.  Despite the cynicism of some listen-
ers, however, the fact that Mr. Woods took pains to make this apology, along 
with the recent public apologies of the chairman of BP Oil Company237 and 
the president of Toyota Motor Corporation,238 is encouraging evidence of the 
importance and value of apologies when wrong-doing has occurred. 
C.   Wisdom for Legal Actors 
The exhaustiveness of Mr. Woods’ apology and its fulfillment of most 
of the categories listed by the author’s Comprehensive Law Practice class 
support the validity of those categories.  It further suggests that lawyers can 
use the categories, or framework set forth above, when counseling their cli-
ents who desire to craft an apology.  For example, a client who wishes to 
apologize but plans to simply say, “I’m sorry,” might be counseled first to 
consider and then to express an understanding of the impact of the injury on 
the other party (if legally appropriate).239  The client might be counseled to 
 
 236. Some might feel that it came too late or that he seemed defensive when he stated: 
But there is one issue I really want to discuss.  Some people have speculated that Elin 
somehow hurt or attacked me on Thanksgiving night.  It angers me that people would 
fabricate a story like that.  She never hit me that night or any other night.  There has nev-
er been an episode of domestic violence in our marriage.  Ever . . . 
Some people have made up things that never happened.  They said I used performance-
enhancing drugs. This is completely and utterly false. . . . 
Some have written things about my family. . . .  However, my behavior doesn’t make it 
right for the media to follow my two-and-a-half-year-old daughter to school and report 
the school’s location.  They staked out my wife and pursued my mom.  Whatever my 
wrongdoings, for the sake of my family, please leave my wife and kids alone. 
Id. (emphases added). 
 237. See MSNBC, supra note 4. 
 238. See THE MONEY TIMES, supra note 5. 
 239. See supra text accompanying note 31 (regarding the desire of those harmed to hear this 
acknowledgement); see also Cohen, supra note 25, at 1014–15 (portraying this acknowledgement as 
part of three defining elements of apology). 
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consider including a statement (if true) of how similar injuries in the future 
could be avoided and the client’s plans (if any) for taking steps to ensure that 
they are prevented, since injured parties often desire such information.240  
Clients who are not well-versed or experienced in making apologies might 
find the foregoing framework, with its categories, useful in considering what 
to include in and exclude from their planned apology, whether written, oral, 
public, private, formal, or informal. 
In addition to the components in the above table, there are a number of 
suggestions and points to remember when integrating apologies into the res-
olution of legal matters.  The following lists a few. 
1.  Use by Partisan Lawyers 
Partisan lawyers can coach their clients in crafting their apologies and 
statements of forgiveness, both in face-to-face encounters and written or 
recorded exchanges.  They can coach harmed persons in accepting or asking 
for apologies.  They can engage mental health experts to assist in evaluating 
and assessing the parties’ readiness for an encounter. 
Lawyers counseling wrongdoers and those harmed by the wrongdoer’s 
acts may want to consider concerns, such as those raised by Smith241 and 
others.242  Some of these are: (1) the wrongdoer must not dispute the facts, 
agree he did wrong, and not believe his behavior is excused or justified;243 
(2) apologies should be delivered as directly as possible, face-to-face,244 but 
if that is impossible, they may be done via performance245 or posting on a 
social network, such as Facebook, MySpace, or Twitter;246 (3) they must be 
 
 240. See, e.g., Stahura, supra note 211, at 43, in which the surviving spouse of a husband killed 
in a car accident wanted the offending driver to join with her in asking the city to institute preventive 
measures to ensure that similar accidents did not occur, in the future.  Id.  Of course, one must be 
mindful of evidentiary rules such as Federal Rules of Evidence 407, 408, and 409 whose parameters 
may circumscribe some apology language for purposes of avoiding admissibility.  See FED. R. EVID. 
407–09. 
 
 241. Smith, supra note 34. 
 
 242. See, e.g., Shuman, supra note 153. 
 
 243. Smith, supra note 34. 
 244. See Facing the Truth, supra note 33. 
 245. See Smith, supra note 34. 
 246. See id.  Intentionally avoiding a face-to-face encounter with those harmed and making an 
apology on Facebook instead may be received as disingenuous, self-serving, and cowardly.  Id. 
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sincere,247 complete, targeted, and accurate;248 (4) public apologies are more 
effective than private ones;249 and (5) the offender must be clearly identi-
fied.250 
2.  Use by Mediators and Dispute Resolution Facilitators 
Lawyers serving as neutral, third-party mediators can be skilled with 
questions and moves designed to non-coercively facilitate apology, for-
giveness, and reconciliation.  They too should assess parties’ readiness for 
these processes and perhaps help parties prepare for them in pre-mediation 
sessions with the mediator (if such sessions are consistent with the media-
tor’s practice).251  When parties expect apologies or forgiveness but receive 
none, the entire encounter can devolve into bickering, which the mediator 
must prevent.252  In these cases, if there is resistance, Scheff says the media-
tor can use gentle questions to stop a party’s moral indignation and lectur-
ing.253  In addition the mediator can either refocus the parties and the pro-
cess, caucus separately with the parties, or halt the process altogether until 
the parties are ready to come together more productively.254 
 
 3.  Lawyer Personality Characteristics 
 
Finally, lawyers are not trained to understand, assess, or create apologies 
or statements of forgiveness.  Instead, they are trained to dissect and analyze 
facts and rules of law and make arguments to bolster the strength of one par-
ty’s position.255  They are more experienced with partisan, positional state-
 
 247. See Facing the Truth, supra note 33, and Smith, supra note 34 (calling this “staged contri-
tion”). 
 248. Smith, supra note 34.  For example, Smith says incomplete apologies occur when the of-
fender does not state the exact offenses he committed or apologizes for a different or lesser offense 
and he argues for more precision in   apology.  Id. 
 249. Smith, supra note 34. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Mark S. Umbreit, Multicultural Implications of Restorative Juvenile Justice, FED. PROB. 
Dec. 1999, at 44, 46, 48. 
 252. Scheff, supra note 51, at 112–17. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Smith, supra note 34. 
 255. DAICOFF, supra note 132, at 25–42 (2004) (containing a survey of empirical research on 
lawyer personality traits and finding that lawyers are generally less sensitive to interpersonal con-
cerns and emotions, compared to nonlawyers). 
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ments.  While mediators and judges might be more prone to have a neutral 
view of disputes, they also are not trained in good “core sequence” form.  
Mediators, judges, and lawyers alike can receive explicit training in the ben-
efits of apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation so they can provide oppor-
tunities for these to occur, actively foster their development, and coach liti-
gants.  To this end, legal personnel can and should study the elements of 
effective apologies and statements of forgiveness. 
Also, lawyers may view apologies differently than do non-lawyers.256  
There is evidence that prosecutors view apologies as a display of weakness 
by the criminal defendant, which encourages the prosecutor to view the de-
fendant’s legal case as weak and therefore susceptible to attack by the prose-
cutor.257  Thus, it is possible that an apology might increase a prosecutor’s 
confidence in his ability to convict the defendant, which decreases the likeli-
hood of his agreement to participate in a diversionary RJ process or a lighter 
sentence pending the outcome of an RJ process.258  There is also evidence 
that lawyers generally do not place as much weight and emphasis on apolo-
gies as non-lawyers.259  When evaluating the desirability of various settle-
ment offers in a hypothetical car accident case where both offers contained 
the same amount of money, non-lawyers rated the offers accompanied by an 
apology higher than those without an apology, and lawyers rated the two of-
fers as the same.260  This suggests that the lawyers simply overlooked the 
value of the apology to the putative plaintiffs.  As a result, lawyers, lawyer-
mediators, and judges might be aware of and attempt to counteract their ten-
dency to devalue apologies.  Comprehensive lawyers and legal personnel, 
however, may be more sensitive to these concerns and to the value of apolo-
gies in general, given the emphasis of the comprehensive law movement on 
 
 256. Smith, supra note 34. 
 257. Margaret Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. 
REV. 295, 309–10 (2007). 
 258. Smith, supra note 34. 
 259. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look 
at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (Nov. 1997). 
 260. Id.  The two offers were to settle the personal injury case arising from the car accident, for 
$25,000 each.  One included an apology by the defendant; the other did not.  In addition, the re-
searchers found that the presence of an initial “low-ball” offer by the defendant and the make of the 
car driven by the defendant (BMW versus Toyota) also affected the nonlawyers’ ratings—and did 
not affect the lawyers’ ratings—of the desirability of the offers made, where the dollar amount of-
fered was the same.  These intangible, nonpecuniary factors affected the nonlawyers but not the law-
yers, highlighting the potential for a “communications gap” between lawyers and clients in personal 
injury cases.  Id. 
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factors beyond legal rights—such as emotions, psychological wellbeing, and 
relationships.261 
By using frameworks such as the one provided above, heeding these 
suggestions, and becoming educated in the field, lawyers, mediators, and 
judges can perform “triage,” by determining which cases are ripe for an 
apology-forgiveness core sequence and which are not.  If a case is ripe, these 
legal personnel can use these ideas to help craft and facilitate effective and 
meaningful apology-forgiveness exchanges between victims and offenders 
or plaintiffs and defendants. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Because of their value and relevance to comprehensive law approaches, 
all comprehensive lawyers, judges, and dispute resolvers should be well-
versed in the core concepts of apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation.  
First, they should know how apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation relate 
to the theory and overall goals of the vectors of the comprehensive law 
movement.  Legal personnel should be able to determine when apology, for-
giveness, and reconciliation might be helpful and should be prepared to 
manage or facilitate their occurrence in civil and criminal cases, when ap-
propriate.  They should know the benefits thereof and be able to communi-
cate those effectively to clients and other involved persons.  They should be 
able to overcome lawyers’ natural tendency to downplay the importance of 
these concepts and be sensitive to how important the concepts may be to 
non-lawyers.  They should be able to coach parties in making effective apol-
ogies and statements of forgiveness or gently question parties to facilitate the 
same.  They should know the pitfalls of apology-forgiveness-reconciliation 
processes and know how to sidestep them. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence, as one of the main vectors of the comprehen-
sive law movement, provides the perfect theoretical framework to explicitly 
integrate social science findings and wisdom regarding the benefits of apol-
ogy, forgiveness, and reconciliation into the law.  TJ’s emphasis on healing, 
rehabilitation, and changed lives explains why, in many legal matters, apol-
ogy, forgiveness, and reconciliation may be important explicit goals.  Simi-
larly, creative problem solving and holistic justice can also benefit from the 
 
 261. Daicoff/Pepperdine, supra note 20, at 56–59 (noting the relevance of traits atypical for 
lawyers, such as cooperation and an emphasis on emotions and interpersonal relationships, to the 
comprehensive law movement). 
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effects of apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation in legal matters.  Evi-
dence shows that apologies have prevented or reduced litigation in medical 
malpractice situations, thus establishing apologies’ relevance to preventive 
law.  Procedural justice explains, from a social science perspective, why ef-
fective apology and forgiveness processes are so valuable to wrongdoers and 
those harmed by the wrongdoer’s acts alike.  Process-oriented vectors such 
as collaborative law, problem solving courts, transformative mediation, and 
restorative justice often inherently provide opportunities for apology, for-
giveness, and reconciliation.  Transformative mediation, restorative justice, 
and the court-ordered treatment involved in drug courts are all processes that 
may explicitly foster the core sequence of apology-forgiveness-
reconciliation.  Finally, apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation are often 
explicit goals of restorative justice approaches to criminal cases.  Deeper ex-
ploration of the requisite components of effective apology and forgiveness 
exchanges can inform lawyers, mediators, and legal decision makers about 
how to facilitate the most effective exchanges between the parties they seek 
to help.  Integrating appropriate opportunities for apology, forgiveness, and 
reconciliation into law is truly furthering “law as a healing profession.” 
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APPENDIX 1 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Concept  Offender’s Apology Mr. Woods’ Statement262 
Consequences To understand and 
acknowledge the im-
pact the O’s actions 
had on the V’s life 
I am also aware of the pain my behavior has 
caused to those of you in this room.  I have let you 
down.  I have let down my fans.  For many of you, 
especially my friends, my behavior has been a per-
sonal disappointment.  To those of you who work 
for me, I have let you down, personally and profes-
sionally.  My behavior has caused considerable 
worry to my business partners. 
To everyone involved in my foundation, including 
my staff, board of directors, sponsors, and most 
importantly, the young students we reach . . .  I 
know I have severely disappointed all of you.  I 
have made you question who I am and how I have 
done the things I did. . . . 
I hurt my wife, my kids, my mother, my wife’s fami-
ly, my friends, my foundation, and kids all around 
the world who admired me. 
Apology/Remorse To apologize, say I’m 
sorry, express re-
morse, regret that the 
event happened to the 
V, in a sincere, non-
selfish, non-self-
focused manner, with 
O being visibly 
ashamed of what he 
did and not being 
angry, which allows 
V to see O as hu-
man—forges bond 
between V & O 
I want to say to each of you, simply, and directly, I 
am deeply sorry for my irresponsible and selfish 
behavior I engaged in. . . . 
I am embarrassed that I have put you in this posi-
tion.  For all that I have done, I am so sorry.  I 
have a lot to atone for. . . . 
Parents used to point to me as a role model for 
their kids.  I owe all of those families a special 
apology.  I want to say to them that I am truly sor-
ry. 
Responsibility To accept responsi-
bility for what hap-
pened, to express 
awareness that the 
event was “wrong” 
and that O did wrong 
Many of you have cheered for me, or worked with 
me, or supported me, and now, every one of you 
has good reason to be critical of me . . . . 
The issue involved here was my repeated irrespon-
sible behavior.  I was unfaithful.  I had affairs.  I 
cheated.  What I did is not acceptable.  And I am 
the only person to blame. . . . I knew my actions 
were wrong . . . . 
I was wrong.  I was foolish.  I don’t get to play by 
different rules.  The same boundaries that apply to 
everyone apply to me.  I brought this shame on 
myself 
Forgiveness To receive V’s for-
giveness 
Finally, there are many people in this room and 
there are many people at home who believed in 
me.  Today, I want to ask for your help.  I ask you 
 
 262. Id. 
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to find room in your hearts to one day believe in 
me again. 
Understanding Explains why the 
offense was done 
May also include 
understanding the V 
as a fellow human 
being 
I know people want to find out how I could be so 
selfish and so foolish.  People want to know how I 
could have done these things to my wife, Elin, and 
to my children. . . .  I knew my actions were 
wrong.  But I convinced myself that normal rules 
didn’t apply.  I never thought about who I was 
hurting.  Instead, I thought only about myself.  I 
ran straight through the boundaries that a married 
couple should live by.  I thought I could get away 
with whatever I wanted to.  I felt that I had worked 
hard my entire life and deserved to enjoy all the 
temptations around me.  I felt I was entitled.  
Thanks to money and fame, I didn’t have far—
didn’t have to go far to find them. . . . 
I stopped living by the core values that I was 
taught to believe in . . . 
As I proceed, I understand people have questions. I 
understand the press wants me to—to ask me for 
the details of the times I was unfaithful.  I under-
stand people want to know whether Elin and I will 
remain together.  Please know that as far as I’m 
concerned, every one of these questions and an-
swers is a matter between Elin and me.  These are 
issues between a husband and a wife. 
Positive Out-
come/Rehabilitatio
n 
To admit that O has a 
problem and express 
O’s willingness to 
change 
It is hard to admit that I need help.  But I do.  For 
forty-five days, from the end of December to early 
February, I was in inpatient therapy, receiving 
guidance for the issues I’m facing.  I have a long 
way to go.  But I’ve taken my first steps in the right 
direction. . . . 
I’ve had a lot of time to think about what I have 
done.  My failures have made me look at myself in 
a way I never wanted to before.  
Restitution to V To express willing-
ness to make material 
restitution to V, out-
line a plan for it 
Elin and I have started the process of discussing 
the damage caused by my behavior.  As she point-
ed out to me, my real apology to her will not come 
in the form of words.  It will come from my behav-
ior over time. . . . 
It is now up to me to make amends.  And that starts 
by never repeating the mistakes I have made.  It is 
up to me to start living a life of integrity. . . . 
I do plan to return to golf one day.  I just don’t 
know when that day will be.  I don’t rule out that it 
will be this year.  When I do return, I need to make 
my behavior more respectful of the game. 
Plan for the Future To describe his plan 
for changing and not 
I recognize I have brought this on myself.  And I 
know above all I am the one who needs to change.  
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recidivating I owe it to my family to become a better person.  I 
owe it to those closest to me to become a better 
man.  That is where my focus will be.  I have a lot 
of work to do.  And I intend to dedicate myself to 
doing it . . . . 
Part of following this path for me is Buddhism, 
which my mother taught me at a young age.  Peo-
ple probably don’t realize it, but I was raised a 
Buddhist, and I actively practiced my faith from 
childhood until I drifted away from it in recent 
years.  Buddhism teaches that a craving for things 
outside ourselves causes an unhappy and pointless 
search for security.  It teaches me to stop following 
every impulse and to learn restraint.  Obviously, I 
lost track of what I was taught. 
As I move forward, I will continue to receive help 
because I have learned that is how people really 
do change.  Starting tomorrow, I will leave for 
more treatment and more therapy. . . . 
In therapy, I have learned that looking at—the im-
portance of looking at my spiritual life and keeping 
in balance with my professional life.  I need to 
regain my balance and be centered so I can save 
the things that are most important to me: my mar-
riage and my children. 
 
That also means relying on others for help.  I have 
learned to seek support from my peers in therapy, 
and I hope someday to return that support to oth-
ers who are seeking help . . . .263 
 
 
 
 263. Id. (emphases added). 
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